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ABSTRACT	  	  Six	   experiments	   addressed	   two	   major	   questions	   related	   to	   the	   development	   of	   infants’	  concern	  for	  fairness:	  1)	  at	  what	  age	  do	  infants	  first	  show	  a	  concern	  for	  fairness	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  objects	  should	  be	  distributed?	  and	  2)	  how	  does	  group	  membership	  influence	  infants’	  expectations	   about	   how	   objects	   should	   be	   distributed?	   In	   Experiment	   1,	   9-­‐month-­‐olds	  expected	  an	  experimenter	   to	  divide	   two	   items	  equally,	  as	  opposed	  to	  unequally,	  between	  two	  individuals.	  Infants	  held	  no	  particular	  expectation	  when	  the	  individuals	  were	  replaced	  with	   inert	   objects,	   or	   when	   the	   experimenter	   simply	   removed	   covers	   in	   front	   of	   the	  individuals	   to	   reveal	   the	   items	   (instead	   of	   distributing	   them).	   In	   Experiment	   2,	   these	  findings	  were	  extended	  to	  4-­‐month-­‐olds	  who	  also	  expected	  an	  experimenter	  to	  divide	  two	  items	   equally	   between	   two	   recipients	  when	   they	  were	   animate	   but	   not	  when	   they	  were	  inert	  or	  when	  the	  experimenter	  removed	  covers	  to	  reveal	  the	  items.	  In	  Experiment	  3,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	   expected	   a	   distributor	   to	   divide	   two	   items	   equally	   between	   two	   similar	  individuals	  who	  belonged	  to	  a	  different	  group.	  In	  Experiment	  4,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expected	  a	  distributor,	  who	  belonged	  to	  the	  same	  group	  as	  one	  of	  two	  potential	  recipients,	  to	  favor	  his	  ingroup	  member	  when	  he	  had	  only	  two	  items	  to	  divide.	  	  Infants	  found	  it	  unexpected	  when	  the	   distributor	   divided	   the	   items	   equally	   or	  when	   he	   gave	   both	   objects	   to	   the	   outgroup	  individual.	   In	  Experiment	  5,	   the	  distributor	  had	   three	   toys	   to	  divide	  (instead	  of	   two)	  and	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  now	  no	  longer	  found	  it	  unexpected	  when	  the	  distributor	  gave	  one	  object	  to	  each	  recipient.	   In	  Experiment	  6,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expected	  an	  experimenter	  who	  had	  many	  new	   markers	   to	   replace	   the	   broken	   marker	   of	   her	   ingroup	   member	   but	   not	   that	   of	   an	  outgroup	  individual	  who	  also	  had	  a	  broken	  marker.	  In	  combination,	  these	  results	  provide	  evidence	  that	  1)	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  already	  expect	  fair	  allocations	  and	  2)	  by	  the	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   In	  my	  dissertation,	  I	  will	  address	  two	  major	  questions	  related	  to	  the	  development	  of	  infants’	  concern	  for	  fairness:	  1)	  at	  what	  age	  do	  infants	  first	  show	  a	  concern	  for	  fairness	  in	  terms	   of	   how	   objects	   should	   be	   distributed?	   (Chapter	   2);	   and	   2)	   how	   does	   group	  membership	   influence	   infants’	   expectations	   about	   how	   objects	   should	   be	   distributed	  (Chapter	  3)?	  	  	  1.1	  BROAD	  APPROACHES	  TO	  MORALITY	  	   Before	   I	   address	   the	   specific	   moral	   principle	   of	   fairness,	   I	   will	   provide	   some	  background	  about	  moral	  development	  research	  more	  broadly.	  Despite	  mankind’s	  millennia	  of	   wonderings	   about	   human	   morality,	   modern	   thinkers	   have	   reached	   no	   more	   of	   a	  consensus	   about	   the	   origins	   or	   causes	   of	   morality.	   While	   many	   theories	   have	   been	  proposed	   and	   even	   tested,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   great	   divide	   between	   those	   who	   argue	   that	  morality	   is	   something	   we	   acquire	   through	   parental	   practices	   and	   other	   socialization	  processes	   (e.g.,	   Eisenberg,	   Fabes,	   &	   Spinrad,	   2006;	   Malti,	   Eisenberg,	   Kim,	   &	   Buchmann,	  2013),	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  morality	  is	  something	  we	  construct	  by	  interacting	  with	  peers	  and	  other	  individuals	  (Turiel,	  2006;	  Turiel,	  2008),	  and	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  morality	  is	  an	  evolved	  adaptation	  (e.g.,	  Brewer,	  1999;	  Dupoux	  &	  Jacob,	  2007;	  Dwyer,	  2006;	  Fiske,	  2004;	  Gintis,	  Henrich,	  Bowles,	  Boyd,	  &	  Fehr	  2008;	  Greene,	  2005;	  Haidt,	  2001;	   Jackendoff,	  2007;	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Nichols,	   2005;	  Mikhail,	   2007;	   Premack,	   2007;	   Sigmund,	   Fehr,	   &	   Novak,	   2002;	   Sripada	   &	  Stich,	  2006).	  	  	   Nancy	  Eisenberg	  and	  her	  colleagues	  argue	  that	  parenting	  is	  the	  primary	  factor	  that	  determines	   whether	   or	   not	   children	   develop	   appropriate	   sympathetic	   responses,	   moral	  emotional	   responses,	   and	   moral	   reasoning	   abilities	   (e.g.,	   Malti,	   Eisenberg,	   Kim,	   &	  Buchmann,	   2013).	   More	   specifically	   they	   argue	   that	   supportive	   parenting,	   defined	   as	   a	  combination	  of	  warmth	  and	  responsiveness,	   leads	   to	  an	   increase	   in	  other-­‐oriented	  moral	  emotions	  (e.g.,	  sympathy)	  as	  well	  as	  more	  advanced	  moral	  reasoning	  abilities.	  	  	  	  	   Elliot	  Turiel	  (2008)	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  takes	  a	  more	  cognitive	  stance	  and	  argues	  for	  a	   domain	   theory	   of	   development,	   proposing	   that	   even	   young	   children	   can	   distinguish	  between	   three	   types	   of	   domains:	   moral,	   social-­‐conventional,	   and	   personal.	   According	   to	  Turiel,	  children	  learn	  how	  to	  make	  judgments	  separately	  in	  each	  domain.	  What	  makes	  the	  moral	  domain	  distinct	  is	  that	  judgments	  are	  based	  on,	  “avoiding	  harm,	  promoting	  people’s	  welfare,	   ensuring	   fairness,	   and	   protecting	   rights”,	   whereas	   judgments	   related	   to	   social	  conventions	  are	  specific	  to	  institutions	  or	  groups	  and	  are	  contingent	  on	  rules	  and	  authority	  (p.	   137).	   Turiel	   argues	   that	   children	   learn	   how	   to	   make	   judgments	   in	   the	   social-­‐conventional	  domain	  primarily	  from	  their	  parents	  and	  other	  adults,	  but	  learn	  how	  to	  make	  appropriate	  judgments	  in	  the	  moral	  domain	  both	  from	  adults	  and	  from	  their	  own	  concern	  for	  others.	   	  Among	  proponents	  of	  the	  evolved-­‐adaptation	  approach,	  there	  are	  many	  viewpoints	  on	   how	   best	   to	   characterize	   humans’	   ability	   to	   reason	   intuitively	   about	   sociomoral	  interactions.	  There	  are	  at	   least	   two	  dimensions	   that	  are	  useful	   in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  different	  accounts.	  One	  dimension	  involves	  whether	  causality	  is	  attributed	  to	  affective	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mechanisms	   (e.g.,	   emotions)	   or	   to	   cognitive	   mechanisms	   (e.g.,	   concepts,	   principles	   or	  heuristics)	   and	   a	   second	   dimension	   is	   whether	   innateness	   is	   limited	   to	   structural	  organization	  or	  includes	  content	  as	  well.	  	  	  For	  example,	  Nichols	  (2005)	  falls	  on	  the	  affective	  end	  of	  the	  first	  dimension	  and	  the	  structural	  organization	  of	  the	  second.	  He	  argues	  that	  we	  have	  innate	  affective	  systems	  that	  respond	  to	  the	  suffering	  of	  others;	  the	  resulting	  emotional	  responses	  then	  gradually	  shape	  relevant	  cognitive	  structures	  so	  that	  they	  (eventually)	  contain	  rules	  telling	  us	  not	  to	  harm	  others	  if	  we	  can	  help	  it.	  Like	  Nichols,	  Sripada	  and	  Stitch	  (2006)	  fall	   toward	  the	  structural	  organization	  end	  on	  the	  second	  dimension;	  however,	  they	  stand	  closer	  to	  the	  cognitive	  end	  on	  the	  first	  dimension.	  They	  argue	  that	  we	  have	  a	  norm-­‐detection	  mechanism	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  recognize	  the	  specific	  types	  of	  rules	  or	  norms	  that	  prevail	  in	  our	  social	  environment.	  Once	  a	  norm	  has	  been	  acquired,	   the	  mechanism	  produces	   intrinsic	  motivation	   to	  comply	  with	  it,	  which	  includes	  punishing	  individuals	  who	  fail	  to	  comply	  with	  it.	  	  Haidt	  (2001,	  2008)	  falls	  somewhere	  in	  between	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  on	  the	  first	  dimension	  and	  closer	  to	  innate	  content	  on	  the	  second	  dimension.	  Haidt	  proposes	  a	  theory	  of	  moral	   intuitions,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  quick,	  automatic,	  affectively	  valenced	  evaluations	  (or	   judgments)	   that	   appear	   in	   the	   conscious	   mind	   independently	   of	   any	   conscious	  reasoning	   or	   weighing	   of	   evidence	   (Haidt,	   2001).	   Haidt	   insists	   that	   he	   is	   not	   drawing	   a	  distinction	   between	   emotion	   and	   cognition,	   but	   rather	   between	   intuition	   and	   reasoning	  and	  argues	  that	  moral	   intuitions	  are	  a	  type	  of	  cognition	  that	  happen	  outside	  of	  conscious	  awareness	  and	  when	  they	  appear	   in	  our	  consciousness	  we	  call	   them	  moral	   judgments.	   In	  more	  recent	  papers,	  Haidt	  argues	  that	  these	  moral	  intuitions	  come	  from	  five	  innate	  moral	  foundations,	   which	   include	   fairness	   and	   harm	   as	   well	   as	   authority,	   loyalty,	   and	   purity	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(Graham	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Haidt,	   2013;	   Haidt	   &	   Graham,	   2007;	   see	   also	  http://www.moralfoundations.org/).	  	  Dupoux	  and	  Jacob	  (2007)	  present	  a	  more	  integrated	  mechanism	  of	  moral	  reasoning,	  falling	  slightly	  closer	  to	  the	  cognitive	  and	  innate-­‐content	  end	  of	  the	  dimensions.	  They	  argue	  that	   when	  we	  witness	   a	   social	   interaction,	   we	   first	   form	   a	  mental	   representation	   of	   the	  causal,	   intentional,	   and	   emotional	   aspects	   of	   the	   situation,	   which	   then	   results	   in	   one	   or	  more	  automatic	   intuitions.	   If	   there	  are	  multiple	   intuitions	   that	   conflict	  with	  one	  another,	  the	  (existing)	  moral	  faculty	  engages	  in	  a	  process	  of	  adjudication,	  which	  eventually	  leads	  to	  a	   judgment	   and	   finally,	   this	   judgment	   leads	   to	   explicit	   beliefs/justifications	   about	   the	  relevant	  situation.	  	  	  Fiske	   (1992,	   2004)	   proposes	   a	   relational	  model	  with	   specific	   innate	   content	   and	  therefore	  falls	  even	  closer	  to	  the	  cognitive	  and	  innate	  content	  ends	  of	  the	  two	  dimensions.	  	  Fiske	   argues	   that	   there	   are	   four	   fundamental	   ways	   that	   people	   relate	   to	   each	   other:	  communal	  sharing	  (individuals	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  category	  should	  be	  treated	  equally),	  authority	   ranking,	   equality	   matching	   (eye-­‐for-­‐an-­‐eye),	   and	   market	   pricing.	   Fiske	   argues	  that	   these	   rules	   are	   “endogenous	   products	   of	   the	   human	  mind,	   generated	   by	   universally	  shared	  models	  of	  and	   for	   social	   relations.”	   (Fiske,	  1992,	  p.	  690).	  Finally,	  Premack	   (2007)	  falls	   closest	   to	   the	   cognitive	   and	   innate	   content	   ends	   of	   each	   dimension;	   he	   proposes	  specific	  innate	  sociomoral	  principles,	  which	  include,	  “deal	  fairly	  with	  others,	  care	  for	  those	  who	  are	  in	  distress,	  and	  do	  not	  harm	  the	  other	  one”	  (p.	  161).	  In	  my	  work,	  I	  adopt	  this	  last	  principle-­‐based	  conception	  of	  sociomoral	  reasoning	  as	  my	  working	  hypothesis,	  because	  it	  is	  consistent	  with	  much	  of	  what	  we	  already	  know	  about	  how	  infants	  reason	  about	  physical	  and	  psychological	  events.	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There	  are	   several	  key	  assumptions	   that	  pertain	   to	   this	  principle-­‐based	  conception	  (or	   cognitive-­‐innate-­‐content-­‐based	   conception,	   more	   broadly	   speaking)	   of	   sociomoral	  reasoning	  that	  are	  worth	  mentioning	  here	  (e.g.,	  Brewer,	  1999;	  Dwyer,	  2009;	  Fiske,	  1992;	  Fiske,	  2004;	  Haidt,	  2008,	  2013;	   Jackendoff,	  2007;	  Premack	  &	  Premack,	  2003;	  Sigmund	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  First,	  humans	  are	  born	  with	  a	  set	  of	  abstract	  sociomoral	  principles	  that	  evolved	  during	  the	  millions	  of	  years	  our	  ancestors	  lived	  in	  small	  groups	  of	  hunter-­‐gatherers,	  where	  survival	   depended	   on	   cooperation.	   Second,	   the	   principles	   determine	   what	   is	   obligatory,	  permissible,	  and	  forbidden	  in	  social	  interactions,	  not	  what	  is	  virtuous.	  And	  third,	  different	  cultures	  rank-­‐order	  and	  elaborate	  the	  principles	  in	  different	  ways,	  which	  helps	  explain	  the	  diverse	  moral	  landscape	  that	  exists	  in	  the	  world	  today.	  	  	  1.2	  PRIOR	  RESEARCH	  ON	  FAIRNESS	  	   There	   are	   currently	   five	   potential	   sociomoral	   principles	   that	   infancy	   researchers	  have	  begun	   to	   study:	   fairness,	  harm,	   ingroup	   love,	  authority	  and	  reciprocity	   (for	   a	   review,	  see	  Baillargeon	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  My	  work	  looks	  primarily	  at	  the	  principle	  of	  fairness	  in	  terms	  of	  how	   resources	   should	   be	   distributed.	   In	   Chapter	   3,	   however,	   I	   also	   examine	   how	   the	  principle	  of	  ingroup-­‐love	  interacts	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  fairness.	  	  	  
A.	  Background	  research	  with	  children	  ages	  3	  and	  older	  Two	  main	  types	  of	   tasks	  have	  been	  used	  to	  examine	  children’s	  expectations	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	   goods:	   first-­‐party	   tasks,	  where	   the	   child	   is	   a	  potential	   recipient	  of	   the	  goods	  (e.g.,	  Fehr,	  Bernhard	  &	  Rockenbach,	  2008;	  Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  and	  third-­‐party	  tasks	  where	  the	  child	  is	  not	  a	  potential	  recipient	  (e.g.,	  Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008;	  Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2009).	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Within	  these	  two	  types	  of	  tasks,	  there	  are	  other	  variations	  such	  as:	  whether	  the	  recipients	  and	   goods	   are	   real	   (e.g.,	   Gerson	   &	   Damon,	   1978;	   Ugurel-­‐Semin,	   1952;	   Warneken	   et	   al.,	  2010)	  or	  hypothetical	  (e.g.,	  Gerson	  &	  Damon,	  1978;	  Peterson,	  Peterson	  &	  McDonald,	  1975;	  Thomson	  &	   Jones,	   2005),	   and	  whether	   the	   goods	  have	  no	   relation	   to	  work	  or	  merit	   (i.e.,	  windfall)	  (Fehr	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Gummerum,	  Hanoch,	  Keller,	  Parsons,	  &	  Hummel,	  2010;	  Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  or	  are	  rewards	  contingent	  on	  work	  or	  merit	  (e.g.,	  Lane	  &	  Coon,	  1972;	  Lerner,	  1974;	  Leventhal	  &	  Anderson,	  1970;	  Sigelman	  &	  Waitzman,	  1991).	  These	   types	  of	   studies	  have	  also	  been	  run	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  cultures,	  including	  Asian	  cultures	  (e.g.,	  Singh	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Tsutsu,	  2010;	  Wong	  &	  Nunes,	  2003)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  remote	  and	  indigenous	  societies	  around	  the	  world	  (e.g.,	  Rochat	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  	  	   Many	  studies,	  using	  both	  types	  of	  tasks	  (first-­‐	  and	  third-­‐party)	  as	  well	  as	  both	  types	  of	  distributions	  (windfall	  and	  rewards),	  have	   found	  that	  children	  5	  years	  and	  older	  show	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness	  in	  these	  contexts	  (e.g.,	  Damon,	  1975;	  Enright,	  Franklin,	  &	  Manheim,	  1980;	   Fehr	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Gummerum	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Moore,	   2009;	   Rochat	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  Thompson,	  Barresi,	  &	  Moore,	  1997;	  Tsutsu,	  2010;	  Ugurel-­‐Semin,	  1952).	  	  However,	   when	  we	   consider	   younger	   children,	   3	   to	   4	   years	   old,	   the	   results	   have	  been	   more	   mixed.	   Studies	   using	   first-­‐party	   tasks	   have	   generally	   been	   negative:	   When	  preschoolers	   are	  asked	   to	  divide	  windfall	   resources	  or	   rewards	  between	   themselves	  and	  others,	   they	   tend	   to	   act	   selfishly,	   keeping	   more	   for	   themselves	   and	   showing	   signs	   of	  inequity	  aversion	  only	  when	  they	  are	  the	  disadvantaged	  party	  (e.g.,	  Damon,	  1975;	  Fehr	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Gummerum	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Hook	  &	  Cook,	  1979;	  LoBue,	  Nishida,	  Chiong,	  DeLoache,	  &	  Haidt,	   2011;	   McCrink,	   Bloom,	   &	   Santos,	   2010;	   Rochat	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   For	   example,	   in	   one	  experiment,	  3-­‐	  to	  4-­‐	  year-­‐olds	  chose	  how	  sweets	  should	  be	  shared	  between	  themselves	  and	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an	  anonymous	  child	  (Fehr	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  They	  chose	  between	  an	  allocation	  of	  one	  sweet	  for	  themselves	  and	  one	  sweet	  for	  their	  partner	  (1,1)	  and	  an	  allocation	  of	  (1,0),	  (1,2),	  or	  (2,0),	  depending	   on	   condition.	   The	   children	   chose	   randomly	   in	   the	   first	   two	   conditions	   (they	  received	  one	  sweet	  either	  way	  and	  did	  not	  much	  consider	  what	  their	  partner	  would	  get),	  and	  they	  chose	  the	  (2,0)	  allocation	  in	  the	  last	  condition,	  to	  maximize	  their	  own	  gain.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  studies	  using	  first-­‐party	  tasks,	  those	  that	  have	  tested	  3-­‐	  to	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  with	   third-­‐party	   tasks	   have	   tended	   to	   be	  more	   positive	   and	   suggest	   that,	   at	   least	   under	  some	   conditions,	   preschoolers	   expect	   resources	   and	   rewards	   to	   be	   divided	   fairly	   among	  recipients	  (e.g.,	  Baumard,	  Mascaro	  &	  Chevallier,	  2012;	  Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008;	  Peterson	  et	  al.,	  1975;	  Thomson	  &	   Jones,	  2005).	  For	  example,	  Olson	  and	  Spelke	   (2008),	   showed	  3.5-­‐year-­‐olds	  five	  dolls;	  one	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  protagonist,	  and	  the	  other	  four	  were	  identified	  as	  the	  protagonist’s	  siblings	  and	  friends	  or	  as	  strangers.	  When	  the	  children	  were	  asked	  to	  help	  the	  protagonist	  allocate	   four	   items,	   they	  divided	  the	   items	  equally	  among	  the	  other	  dolls,	  regardless	  of	  how	  they	  were	  identified.	  In	  another	  third-­‐party	  experiment,	  Baumard	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  told	  3-­‐and	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  a	  simple	  story	  illustrated	  with	  pictures.	  In	  the	  story,	  Amélie	  and	   Hélène	   began	   to	   bake	   cookies	   together,	   but	   soon	   after	   they	   began	   Hélène	   stopped	  working	  and	  began	  to	  play,	  leaving	  Amélie	  to	  finish	  on	  her	  own.	  In	  one	  condition,	  children	  were	  shown	  a	  large	  and	  a	  small	  cookie	  and	  asked	  who	  should	  receive	  the	  large	  cookie.	  Both	  3-­‐	  and	  4-­‐year-­‐olds	  were	  reliably	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  the	  large	  cookie	  to	  Amélie	  (the	  worker)	  than	  to	  Hélène	  (the	  slacker).	  In	  another	  condition,	  children	  were	  shown	  three	  cookies	  and	  asked	  to	  distribute	  them;	  at	  each	  age,	  children	  were	  reliably	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  two	  cookies	  to	  the	  worker	  than	  to	  the	  slacker.	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The	  results	  of	  the	  third-­‐party	  studies	  presented	  so	  far	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  each	  of	  the	  three	  broad	  approaches	  to	  moral	  development	  discussed	  above:	  socialization,	  cognitive	  construction	   and	   evolved	   adaptation.	   For	   example,	   proponents	   of	   the	   socialization	   view	  might	   say	   that	   children	   as	   young	   as	   3.5	   years	   succeed	   in	   third-­‐party	   tasks	   because	   they	  have	   had	   sufficient	   time	   to	   learn	   from	   their	   social	   world	   that	   fairness	   should	   prevail	   in	  these	  situations.	  Similarly,	  proponents	  of	  the	  cognitive	  construction	  view	  might	  argue	  that	  by	   3.5	   years	   children	   have	   already	   constructed	   some	   understanding	   of	   moral	   rules,	  particularly	  fairness.	  Finally,	  proponents	  of	  the	  evolved	  adaptation	  view	  might	  suggest	  that	  3.5-­‐year-­‐olds	  succeed	  in	  these	  third-­‐party	  tasks	  because	  they	  have	  an	  innate	  understanding	  of	   fairness	   they	  can	  apply	   in	   these	  situations.	   It	   is	  also	   likely	   that	  proponents	  of	  all	   three	  views	  would	  give	  similar	  explanations	  (involving	   lack	  of	   inhibition	  and	  self-­‐control)	  as	   to	  why	   these	   same	   children	   fail	   in	   first-­‐party	   tasks.	   Since	   all	   three	   views	   offer	   reasonable	  explanations	   for	   why	   3.5-­‐year-­‐olds	   succeed	   in	   third-­‐party	   tasks,	   in	   order	   to	   begin	   to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  different	  views,	  in	  my	  own	  work	  I	  look	  at	  infants	  using	  third-­‐party	  situations.	  	  	  
B.	  Background	  research	  with	  infants	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life	  	   Building	  on	  the	  positive	  results	  of	  the	  third-­‐party	  tasks	  described	  in	  the	  last	  section,	  several	   researchers	   have	   begun	   to	   look	   at	   fairness	   in	   the	   second	   year	   of	   life	   (Geraci	   &	  Surian,	   2011;	   Schmidt	  &	   Sommerville,	   2011;	   Sloane,	   Baillargeon,	   &	   Premack,	   2012).	   The	  results	  of	  these	  studies	  show:	  1)	  by	  15	  to	  19	  months	  of	  age,	  infants	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  divide	   windfall	   resources	   fairly	   (Schmidt	   &	   Sommerville,	   2011;	   Sloane	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   2)	  infants	  prefer	  a	  fair	  distributor	  over	  an	  unfair	  distributor	  (Geraci	  &	  Surian,	  2011),	  and	  3)	  by	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21	   months,	   infants	   expect	   an	   experimenter	   to	   distribute	   rewards	   equally	   between	   two	  individuals	  when	   both	   have	  worked,	   but	   not	  when	   one	   has	  worked	  while	   the	   other	   has	  chosen	  not	  to	  (Sloane	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  In	  the	  study	  of	  Sloane	  et	  al.,	  (2012),	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  were	  shown	  live	  events	  in	  which	  an	   experimenter	   divided	   two	   objects	   (toys,	   cookies	   or	   cars)	   between	   two	   identical	  animated	   puppet	   giraffes.	   On	   alternate	   trials	   for	   three	   pairs	   of	   trials,	   the	   infants	   saw	   an	  equal	  allocation	  (equal	  event)	  where	  the	  experimenter	  gave	  one	  object	  to	  each	  giraffe	  and	  an	  unequal	  allocation	  (unequal	  event)	  where	  she	  gave	  both	  objects	  to	  one	  giraffe	  and	  none	  to	  the	  other.	  The	  infants	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  at	  the	  final	  paused	  scene	  in	  the	  unequal	  than	  in	   the	   equal	   event,	   suggesting	   that	   by	   19	  months,	   infants	   expect	   a	   distributor	   to	   divide	  resources	   fairly	   between	   two	   similar	   recipients.	   This	   conclusion	   was	   supported	   by	   two	  control	  conditions.	   In	  one,	   the	  giraffes	  were	   inanimate	  (they	  never	  moved	  or	  talked),	  and	  	  infants	  looked	  about	  equally	  at	  the	  two	  test	  events.	  In	  the	  other	  control	  condition,	  instead	  of	   bringing	   in	   and	   distributing	   the	   two	   objects	   in	   each	   trial,	   the	   experimenter	   removed	  covers	   resting	   over	   the	   giraffes’	   placemats	   to	   reveal	   the	   objects;	   infants	   again	   looked	  equally	   at	   the	   two	   test	   events,	   suggesting	   that	   they	   did	   not	   merely	   expect	   similar	  individuals	  to	  have	  similar	  numbers	  of	  items.	  	  In	  the	  study	  by	  Geraci	  and	  Surian	  (2011)	  16-­‐month-­‐old	  infants	  watched	  computer-­‐animated	   events	   involving	   five	   different	   characters:	   two	  distributors	   (a	   bear	   and	   a	   lion),	  two	  recipients	  (a	  donkey	  and	  a	  cow),	  and	  one	  observer	  (a	  chicken).	  The	  infants	  first	  saw	  an	  
equal	  event	  in	  two	  trials	  and	  an	  unequal	  event	  in	  two	  trials.	   	   In	  the	  equal	  event,	  the	  “fair”	  distributor	   gave	   one	   disc	   to	   each	   of	   two	   recipients	   while	   the	   observer	   watched;	   in	   the	  unequal	  event,	  the	  “unfair”	  distributor	  gave	  both	  discs	  to	  the	  same	  recipient.	  At	  the	  end	  of	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the	  session,	   the	   infants	  also	  received	  a	  choice	   task	  (modeled	  after	  Hamlin	  et	  al.,	  2007)	   in	  which	  they	  were	  presented	  with	  pictures	  of	  the	  fair	  and	  unfair	  distributors	  and	  encouraged	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  picture	  they	  wanted.	  Results	   indicated	  that,	  although	  the	   infants	   tended	  to	  look	  equally	  at	  the	  equal	  and	  unequal	  events	  (I	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  in	  Chapter	  2),	  they	  were	  reliably	  more	   likely	   to	   reach	   for	   the	   fair	   than	   the	  unfair	  distributor.	  This	  preference	  was	  eliminated	  in	  a	  control	  condition	  where	  the	  recipients	  were	  inanimate	  artifacts	  rather	  than	  animate	   characters.	   In	   combination,	   these	   results	   indicate	   that	   by	   16	   months,	   infants	  already	  show	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness,	  and	  this	  sensitivity	  guides	  their	  social	  preferences.	  	  Schmidt	   and	   Sommerville	   (2011)	   showed	   15-­‐month-­‐olds	   videotaped	   events	   in	  which	  a	  female	  distributor	  divided	  either	  crackers	  or	  milk	  between	  two	  female	  recipients.	  In	  the	  cracker	  scenario,	  for	  example,	  the	  distributor	  held	  up	  a	  clear	  bowl	  with	  four	  crackers	  and	  the	  recipients	  slid	  their	  empty	  plates	  toward	  her.	  The	  distributor	  then	  placed	  crackers	  on	   the	  plates;	   however,	   the	   infants	  were	  unable	   to	   see	  how	   she	  distributed	   the	   crackers	  because	  her	   actions	  were	   blacked	  out	   (a	   screen	   appeared	   on	   the	   computer	  monitor	   that	  occluded	  the	  bowl	  and	  plates).	  Next,	   the	   infants	  saw	  two	  still	   frames	  (in	  counterbalanced	  order)	  in	  which	  the	  empty	  bowl	  rested	  in	  front	  of	  the	  distributor	  while	  the	  two	  recipients	  looked	  down	  at	  their	  plates;	  in	  the	  equal	  frame,	  each	  recipient	  had	  two	  crackers,	  and	  in	  the	  
unequal	   frame,	  one	  recipient	  had	  one	  cracker	  and	   the	  other	  recipient	  had	   three	  crackers.	  The	  infants	   looked	  reliably	   longer	  at	  the	  unequal	  than	  at	  the	  equal	  frame,	  suggesting	  that	  they	   expected	   the	   distributor	   not	   only	   to	   give	   some	   resources	   to	   each	   recipient,	   but	   to	  divide	  them	  equally	  between	  the	  two	  recipients.	  This	  effect	  was	  not	  observed	  in	  additional	  control	   trials	   where	   the	   infants	   saw	   the	   same	   still	   frames	   without	   the	   distributor	   and	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recipients.	  These	  results	  suggest	   that	  by	  15	  months,	   infants	  detect	  a	  violation	  even	  when	  both	  recipients	  are	  given	  some	  objects,	  but	  in	  unequal	  amounts.	  	  In	   combination,	   the	   results	   presented	   so	   far	   suggest	   that	   15-­‐	   to	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expect	   distributors	   to	   divide	   resources	   fairly	   and	   prefer	   “fair”	   over	   “unfair”	   distributors.	  However,	  from	  these	  results	  alone,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  developmental	  processes	  are	  driving	  these	  expectations.	  For	  example,	  by	  15	  months,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  infants	  possess	  a	  simple	  rule	   that	   everyone	   should	   always	   be	   treated	   equally,	   independent	   of	   context.	   	   It	   is	   also	  possible	   that	   infants	   are	  more	   sophisticated	   and	   can	   take	   the	   context	   of	   a	   situation	   into	  account.	  One	  way	  to	  sort	  out	  whether	  infants	  simply	  expect	  everyone	  to	  be	  treated	  equally	  or	   whether	   they	   have	   a	   context-­‐dependent	   understanding	   of	   fairness	   is	   to	   look	   at	   their	  expectations	   in	   situations	   that	   involve	   rewarding	   others	   based	   on	   effort.	   Evidence	   that	  infants	  detect	  a	  violation	  when	  an	  individual	  who	  does	  not	  deserve	  a	  reward	  receives	  one	  anyway	   would	   argue	   against	   the	   conclusion	   that	   infants	   simply	   expect	   everyone	   to	   be	  treated	  equally.	  	  To	  address	  this	  issue,	  Sloane,	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  presented	  21-­‐month-­‐olds	  with	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	   a	   female	   experimenter	   asked	   two	   female	   individuals	   to	   put	   away	   toys	   in	   clear	  boxes.	  In	  the	  explicit	  condition,	  the	  experimenter	  told	  the	  individuals	  they	  would	  receive	  a	  reward	  (a	  smiley-­‐face	  sticker)	  if	  they	  complied.	  In	  the	  implicit	  condition,	  the	  experimenter	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  rewards	  beforehand	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  infants	  would	  hold	  expectations	  about	  the	  dispensation	  of	  rewards	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  explicit	  contract.	  In	  each	  condition,	  infants	  received	  a	  single	  test	  trial	  in	  which	  they	  saw	  either	  one	  individual	  work	   while	   the	   other	   played	   (one-­‐works	   event)	   or	   both	   individuals	   work	   (both-­‐work	  event).	  We	   reasoned	   that	   if	   infants	   looked	   reliably	   longer	  when	  shown	   the	  one-­‐works	  as	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opposed	   to	   the	   both-­‐work	   event,	   this	   would	   suggest	   that	   21-­‐month-­‐olds	   expect	   a	  distributor	   to	   reward	   individuals	   according	   to	   their	   efforts;	   and	   that	   is	   exactly	  what	  we	  found.	   Infants	   were	   also	   tested	   in	   a	   control	   condition	   identical	   to	   the	   explicit	   condition	  except	   that	   the	   individuals’	   boxes	   were	   not	   transparent,	   making	   it	   impossible	   for	   the	  experimenter	   to	   determine	   who	   had	   worked	   and	   who	   had	   not.	   This	   control	   condition	  served	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   infants	   in	   the	   explicit	   and	   implicit	   conditions	  looked	   reliably	   longer	   at	   the	   one-­‐works	   event	   not	   because	   they	   were	   puzzled	   that	   the	  experimenter	  rewarded	  the	  worker	  and	  the	  slacker	  equally	  (even	  though	  she	  knew,	   from	  inspecting	   the	   boxes,	   that	   the	   slacker	   had	   done	   no	   work),	   but	   because	   they	   were	  responding	  to	  tangential	  aspects	  of	  the	  event	  (e.g.,	   they	  were	  puzzled	  that	  the	  slacker	  did	  no	  work,	  or	   they	  preferred	  to	  see	  all	   the	  toys	   in	  one	  box).	  The	  most	  compelling	  aspect	  of	  this	   finding,	   in	   combination	  with	   the	   findings	  presented	  above,	   is	   the	   implication	   that	  by	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life,	  infants	  already	  have	  a	  nuanced	  sense	  of	  fairness	  that	  is	  equity	  based	  and	   enables	   them	   to	   take	   the	   context	   of	   a	   situation	   into	   account	   (i.e.,	   they	   don’t	   simply	  expect	  all	  objects	  to	  be	  distributed	  equally).	  While	  these	  results	  do	  not	  provide	  definitive	  evidence	  that	  an	  evolved	  framework	  guides	  early	  sociomoral	  reasoning,	  they	  certainly	  are	  consistent	  with	  such	  an	  account.	  	  	  In	  my	  research,	  I	  build	  on	  these	  results:	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  I	  ask	  how	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	   life	  expect	  windfall	  resources	  to	  be	  distributed.	  Testing	   infants	   in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	   is	   a	   critical	   way	   to	   evaluate	   competing	   views	   of	   moral	   development,	   because	   the	  younger	   infants	   are,	   the	   less	   likely	   it	   becomes	   that	   their	   expectations	   are	   due	   to	   social	  learning	  or	  to	  cognitive	  construction	  (given	  that	  they	  have	  spent	  very	   little	  time	  on	  earth	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and	   lack	  much	   experience	   in	   the	   social	  world)	   and	   the	  more	   likely	   it	   becomes	   that	   their	  expectations	  are	  guided	  by	  innate	  principles	  and	  concepts.	  	  	  	  	  1.3	  INGROUP	  LOVE	  	   Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  moral	  development	  that	  interacts	  with	  fairness	  is	  how	  we	  preferentially	  treat	  members	  of	  our	  own	  group.	  The	  ingroup	  principle	  states:	  Members	  of	   a	   social	   group	   should	   act	   in	  ways	   that	   sustain	   the	   group	   (e.g.,	   Brewer,	   1999;	  Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2007;	  Tajfel	  et	  al.,	  1971).	  The	  ingroup	  principle	  has	  two	  corollaries,	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	   ingroup	   support.	   Ingroup	   loyalty	   dictates	   that	   in	   situations	   involving	   ingroup	   and	  outgroup	  individuals,	  one	  should	  (1)	  prefer	  and	  align	  with	  ingroup	  as	  opposed	  to	  outgroup	  individuals,	   (2)	   protect	   ingroup	   individuals	  who	   are	   threatened	   by	   outgroup	   aggressors,	  and	   (3)	   display	   favoritism	   toward	   ingroup	   over	   outgroup	   individuals	   (e.g.,	   when	  distributing	   resources).	   Ingroup	   support	   dictates	   that	   when	   interacting	   with	   ingroup	  individuals,	  one	  should	  (1)	  engage	  in	  prosocial	  actions	  such	  as	  helping	  ingroup	  members	  in	  need	   of	   assistance,	   comforting	   ingroup	  members	   in	   distress,	   and	   sharing	   resources	  with	  ingroup	  members,	  and	  (2)	  limit	  negative	  interactions	  within	  the	  ingroup	  by	  refraining	  from	  unprovoked	  negative	  actions,	  curbing	  retaliatory	  actions,	  and	  engaging	  in	  social	  acting,	  the	  everyday	  social	  pretense	  that	  adults	  engage	  in	  –	  in	  the	  form	  of	  white	  lies,	  false	  cheer,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  to	  avoid	  hurtful	  or	  awkward	  interactions	  with	  ingroup	  members	  (e.g.,	  Baillargeon	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Yang	  &	  Baillargeon,	  2013).	  	  Here,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  determining	  at	  what	  age	  infants	  begin	  to	  show	  sensitivity	  to	  ingroups	   and	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   posses	   expectations	   of	   ingroup	   loyalty	   that	   might	  interact	  with	  their	  expectations	  of	   fairness.	  Many	  studies	  with	  children	  ages	  3	  to	  10	  have	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found	  that	  they	  do	  show	  favoritism	  toward	  ingroup	  members	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  group	  is	  a	  real	  group	  (e.g.,	  based	  on	  race	  or	  gender)	  or	  a	  minimal	  group	  (e.g.,	  based	  on	  an	   arbitrary	   factor	   such	   as	   tee-­‐shirt	   color).	   For	   example,	  Olson	   and	   Spelke	   (2008)	   found	  that	  when	  resources	  are	  scarce,	  children	  as	  young	  as	  3.5	  years	  will	  give	  more	  to	  friends	  and	  family	   than	   to	   strangers.	   However,	   very	   little	   research	   has	   been	   done	   with	   children	  younger	  than	  3.5	  years,	  so	  many	  questions	  remain	  to	  be	  answered:	  For	  example,	  do	  infants	  possess	   an	   expectation	   of	   ingroup	   loyalty?	   If	   yes,	   how	   and	  when	   do	   they	   learn	   to	   rank-­‐order	  fairness	  and	  ingroup	  loyalty	  in	  situations	  where	  both	  principles	  compete	  and	  suggest	  different	  courses	  of	  actions?	  It	  seems	  possible	  that	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  different	  approaches	  to	  moral	  development	  (i.e.,	   socialization,	   cognitive	   construction,	   and	   evolved	   adaptation)	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	  development	   of	   ingroup	   loyalty.	   Since	   we	   are	   not	   yet	   able	   to	   definitively	   answer	   the	  questions	  raised	  above,	  it	  is	  possible,	  for	  example,	  that	  infants	  do	  come	  into	  this	  world	  with	  an	  expectation	  of	  ingroup	  loyalty,	  but	  that	  socialization	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  teaching	  them,	  in	  conflicting	  situations,	  when	   to	   follow	  the	  principle	  of	   ingroup	   loyalty	  and	  when	   to	   follow	  the	  principle	  of	  fairness.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  infants	  have	  to	  develop	  advanced	  cognitive	  processes	  to	  reason	  about	  complex	  situations	  where	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	  fairness	  interact,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  distributor	  has	  numerous	  objects	  to	  divide	  between	  ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  individuals.	  	  	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  answer	  some	  of	  these	  questions	  by	  exploring	  how	  the	  principle	  of	  ingroup	  loyalty	  might	  interact	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  fairness	  and	  in	  what	  ways	  the	   different	   approaches	   to	   morality	   might	   explain	   developments	   in	   infants’	   responses.	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Here	  I	  will	  test	  infants	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life	  to	  determine	  how	  their	  expectations	  about	  fairness	  change	  in	  contexts	  where	  it	  is	  pitted	  against	  ingroup	  loyalty.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
EXPECTATIONS	  OF	  FAIRNESS	  IN	  THE	  FIRST	  YEAR	  OF	  LIFE	  2.1	  EXPERIMENT	  1	  (9-­‐MONTH-­‐OLDS)	  Recently,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  handful	  of	  studies	  that	  have	  looked	  at	  infants’	  sensitivity	  to	   fairness	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   life	   (e.g.,	   Geraci	   &	   Surian,	   2011;	   Meristo	   &	   Surian,	   2013;	  Sommerville	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   However,	   these	   results	   have	   been	   mixed,	   giving	   rise	   to	   two	  diverging	  hypotheses	  concerning	  the	  early	  development	  of	  fairness.	  The	  mixed	  results	  with	  young	  infants	  have	  come	  from	  three	  different	  resource-­‐allocation	  tasks.	  In	  a	  one-­‐distributor	  task,	   12-­‐month-­‐olds	   watched	   events	   in	   which	   a	   single	   distributor	   divided	   four	   items	  between	   two	   recipients	   (Sommerville	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   In	   the	   unfair-­‐allocation	   event,	   the	  distributor	  gave	  three	  items	  to	  one	  recipient	  and	  one	  item	  to	  the	  other	  recipient;	  in	  the	  fair-­‐allocation	   event,	   the	   distributor	   gave	   two	   items	   to	   each	   recipient.	   Infants	   looked	   about	  equally	  at	  the	  two	  events.	  In	  a	  two-­‐distributor	  task,	  11-­‐month-­‐olds	  watched	  events	  in	  which	  two	  different	  distributors	  took	  turns	  dividing	  two	  items	  between	  two	  recipients	  (Geraci	  &	  Surian,	   2011).	   In	   the	   unfair-­‐distributor	   event,	   one	   distributor	   gave	   two	   items	   to	   one	  recipient	  and	  none	  to	  the	  other	  recipient;	  in	  the	  fair-­‐distributor	  event,	  the	  other	  distributor	  gave	  one	  item	  to	  each	  recipient.	  Here	  again,	  infants	  looked	  about	  equally	  at	  the	  two	  events.	  Finally,	   in	   a	   preference	   task	   (Meristo	   &	   Surian,	   2013),	   10-­‐month-­‐olds	   first	   saw	   fair-­‐	   and	  unfair-­‐distributor	   events	   that	   also	   involved	   a	   bystander	  who	  witnessed	   the	   distributors’	  actions.	  Next,	  infants	  watched	  events	  in	  which	  the	  bystander	  brought	  in	  one	  item	  and	  gave	  it	  to	  either	  the	  unfair	  distributor	  (prefers-­‐unfair	  event)	  or	  the	  fair	  distributor	  (prefers-­‐fair	  event).	   Infants	   looked	   reliably	   longer	   at	   the	   prefers-­‐unfair	   than	   at	   the	   prefers-­‐fair	   event,	  and	  this	  effect	  was	  eliminated	  when	  the	  bystander	  did	  not	  witness	  the	  distributors’	  actions.	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   The	   preceding	   results	   are	   compatible	   with	   two	   diverging	   hypotheses	   concerning	  early	   responses	   to	   fairness.	  One	  hypothesis,	   termed	   the	   late-­‐emergence	  hypothesis,	  holds	  that	   infants	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   life	   possess	   no	   expectation	   about	   whether	   a	   distributor	  should	  divide	  resources	  fairly	  or	  unfairly	  (this	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  negative	  results	  obtained	  with	   12-­‐	   and	   11-­‐month-­‐olds	   in	   the	   one-­‐	   and	   two-­‐distributor	   tasks).	   As	   they	   observe	   the	  social	   world,	   however,	   infants	   rapidly	   learn	   that	   being	   a	   fair	   distributor	   confers	   social	  advantages	  that	  being	  an	  unfair	  distributor	  does	  not:	  whereas	  fair	  distributors	  tend	  to	  be	  preferred	   or	   rewarded,	   unfair	   distributors	   tend	   to	   be	   shunned	   or	   punished	   (this	   is	  suggested	   by	   the	   positive	   results	   obtained	   with	   10-­‐month-­‐olds	   in	   the	   preference	   task).	  These	   observations	   gradually	   lead	   infants,	   sometime	   after	   their	   first	   birthday,	   to	   expect	  individuals	   to	   produce	   fair	   as	   opposed	   to	   unfair	   allocations	   (this	   is	   suggested	   by	   the	  positive	  results	  that	  have	  been	  obtained	  with	  infants	  ages	  15-­‐19	  months	  in	  one-­‐distributor	  tasks;	  Schmidt	  &	  Sommerville,	  2011;	  Sloane	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  The	  other	  hypothesis,	  termed	  the	  early-­‐emergence	  hypothesis,	  assumes	  that	  infants	  in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   life	   do	   expect	   distributors	   to	   act	   fairly,	   but	   can	   demonstrate	   this	  expectation	   only	   under	   limited	   conditions.	   In	   this	   view,	   the	   negative	   results	   described	  above	   are	   open	   to	   alternative	   interpretations	   that	   preserve	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   early	  emerging	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness.	  First,	  consider	  the	  negative	  results	  of	  the	  one-­‐distributor	  task	   (Sommerville	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   These	   results	   could	   stem	   from	   performance	   limitations:	  perhaps	   12-­‐month-­‐olds	   expect	   fair	   allocations,	   but	   for	   ancillary	   reasons	   have	   difficulty	  tracking	   allocations	   involving	   as	   many	   as	   four	   items	   to	   two	   potential	   recipients.	   Next,	  consider	  the	  negative	  results	  of	  the	  two-­‐distributor	  task	  (Geraci	  &	  Surian,	  2011).	  Although	  this	   task	   involved	   simple	   two-­‐item	   allocations,	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   second	   distributor	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could	  have	  caused	  interpretive	  ambiguities.	  In	  a	  one-­‐distributor	  task,	  the	  same	  distributor	  produces	   the	   fair	   and	   unfair	   allocations	   on	   alternate	   trials,	   so	   that	   a	   justification	   for	   the	  unfair	   allocation	   is	  hard	   to	   come	  by	   (what	   reason	  could	   the	  distributor	  have	   to	   treat	   the	  recipients	   fairly	   in	  one	  trial	  but	  unfairly	   in	  the	  next?).	   In	  a	  two-­‐distributor	  task,	  however,	  different	  distributors	  produce	  the	  fair	  and	  unfair	  allocations,	  so	  that	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  unfair	   allocation	   becomes	   possible:	   perhaps	   the	   shunned	   recipient	   previously	   acted	  negatively	  toward	  the	  unfair	  distributor,	  whose	  actions	  are	  thus	  retaliatory	  (e.g.,	  Dunfield	  &	  Kuhlmeier,	   2010;	   Hamlin	   et	   al.,	   2011);	   or	   perhaps	   the	   unfair	   distributor	   is	   employing	   a	  strategy	  of	  alternating	  between	  recipients	  (e.g.,	  two	  items	  for	  this	  recipient,	  then	  two	  items	  for	  that	  recipient)	  and	  is	  incompetently	  losing	  track	  of	  who	  has	  received	  what	  across	  trials	  (e.g.,	  Chow	  &	  Poulin-­‐Dubois,	  2009;	  Zmyj	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Is	   the	   late-­‐emergence	  or	   the	   early-­‐emergence	  hypothesis	   correct?	  To	   address	   this	  question,	   I	   tested	   9-­‐month-­‐olds	   with	   a	   simple	   two-­‐item	   one-­‐distributor	   task:	   an	  experimenter	   divided	   two	   cookies	   either	   equally	   or	   unequally	   between	   two	   animated	  puppet	  penguins.	  According	  to	  the	  late-­‐emergence	  hypothesis,	  results	  should	  be	  negative,	  because	  young	  infants	  still	  lack	  any	  expectation	  about	  whether	  a	  distributor	  should	  divide	  resources	  fairly	  or	  unfairly.	  According	  to	  the	  early-­‐emergence	  hypothesis,	  however,	  results	  should	   be	   positive,	   because	   even	   young	   infants	   ought	   to	   expect	   fairness	   in	   the	   simple	  situation	   used	   here.	   Positive	   results	   would	   thus	   (1)	   support	   the	   early-­‐emergence	  hypothesis,	  (2)	  provide	  the	  first	  demonstration	  that	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  already	  expect	   a	   distributor	   to	   divide	   resources	   fairly,	   (3)	   constrain	   theoretical	   accounts	   of	   the	  developmental	   origins	   of	   fairness,	   and	   (4)	   inform	   the	   methodological	   assessment	   of	  fairness	  in	  early	  infancy.	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Design	  Infants	  were	  assigned	  to	  an	  experimental,	  an	  inanimate-­‐control,	  or	  a	  cover-­‐control	  condition	  (this	  task	  was	  adapted	  from	  Sloane	  et	  al.,	  (2012);	  as	  was	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  they	  obtained	  positive	   results	  with	  19-­‐month-­‐olds).	   Infants	   in	   the	  experimental	   condition	  (Fig.	   1)	   received	   one	   recipient-­‐familiarization	   trial	   and	   two	   test	   trials;	   each	   trial	   had	   an	  initial	   and	   a	   final	   phase.	   At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   recipient-­‐familiarization	   trial,	   two	   identical	  puppet	   penguins	   (placed	   on	   the	   hands	   of	   a	   hidden	   female	   assistant)	   protruded	   from	  openings	  in	  the	  back	  wall	  of	  a	  puppet-­‐stage	  apparatus;	  in	  front	  of	  each	  penguin	  was	  a	  small	  placemat.	   During	   the	   initial	   (12-­‐s)	   phase	   of	   the	   trial,	   the	   penguins	   “danced”	   by	   tilting	  alternately	  left	  and	  right,	  changing	  side	  every	  second.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  trial,	  the	  penguins	  paused	  upright,	  and	  infants	  watched	  this	  paused	  scene	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  The	  recipient-­‐familiarization	  trial	  thus	  served	  to	  introduce	  the	  penguins.	  During	  the	  initial	  (26-­‐s)	   phase	   of	   each	   test	   trial,	   the	   penguins	   danced	   until	   a	   female	   experimenter	   opened	   a	  curtained	  window	  in	  the	  right	  wall	  of	  the	  apparatus;	  the	  penguins	  then	  turned	  toward	  the	  experimenter,	  as	  though	  to	  observe	  her	  actions.	  The	  experimenter	  brought	  in	  a	  plate	  with	  two	   identical	   cookies	   and	   announced,	   “I	   have	   cookies!”;	   the	   penguins	   responded	  simultaneously,	   “Yay,	   yay!”	   (in	   distinct	   voices;	   the	   assistant	   and	   a	   female	   supervisor	  standing	  next	  to	  her	  spoke	  these	  utterances).	  Next,	  the	  experimenter	  placed	  one	  cookie	  on	  the	   placemat	   in	   front	   of	   one	   penguin;	   which	   penguin	   received	   the	   first	   cookie	   was	  counterbalanced	  across	  infants.	  The	  experimenter	  then	  placed	  the	  other	  cookie	  in	  front	  of	  either	  the	  same	  penguin	  (unequal	  event)	  or	  the	  other	  penguin	  (equal	  event);	   the	  order	  of	  the	   two	  events	  was	  counterbalanced.	  Finally,	   the	  experimenter	   left	  with	  her	  empty	  plate,	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and	   the	   penguins	   looked	   down	   at	   their	   placemats	   and	   paused.	   During	   the	   final	   phase	   of	  each	  trial,	  infants	  watched	  this	  paused	  scene	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  The	  inanimate-­‐control	  condition	  (Fig.	  2)	  served	  to	  rule	  out	  low-­‐level	  interpretations	  such	   as	   baseline	   preferences	   for	   asymmetrical	   displays	   or	   for	   displays	   involving	   two	  cookies	   placed	   side	   by	   side.	   Infants	   saw	   events	   identical	   to	   those	   in	   the	   experimental	  condition	  except	  that	  the	  penguins	  were	  inanimate:	  they	  never	  moved	  or	  talked,	  but	  simply	  faced	  forward	  (they	  rested	  on	  hidden	  posts).	  Finally,	   the	   cover-­‐control	   condition	   (Fig.	   3)	   served	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	  infants	   merely	   expected	   similar	   individuals	   to	   have	   similar	   numbers	   of	   objects.	   The	  recipient-­‐familiarization	  trial	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition,	  with	  the	  animated	  penguins.	  In	  the	  initial	  (26-­‐s)	  phase	  of	  each	  test	  trial,	   instead	  of	  bringing	  in	  and	  distributing	  the	  two	  cookies,	  the	  experimenter	  removed	  covers	  resting	  over	  the	  penguins’	  placemats	   to	   reveal	   the	   cookies;	   the	   covers	   were	   removed	   one	   at	   a	   time,	   with	   order	  counterbalanced	  across	  infants.	  The	  experimenter	  did	  not	  speak	  in	  this	  condition,	  but	  the	  penguins	   greeted	  her	   (“Yay,	   yay!”)	   as	   she	   arrived.	   In	   the	  unequal	   event,	   the	   covers	  were	  removed	  to	  reveal	  two	  cookies	  on	  one	  placemat	  and	  none	  on	  the	  other;	  in	  the	  equal	  event,	  the	   covers	  were	   removed	   to	   reveal	  one	   cookie	  on	  each	  placemat.	  After	   the	  experimenter	  left,	  the	  penguins	  looked	  down	  and	  paused,	  as	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition.	  We	  reasoned	  that	  if	   infants	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  at	  the	   unequal	   than	   at	   the	   equal	   event,	   but	   infants	   in	   the	   inanimate-­‐	   and	   cover-­‐control	  conditions	   looked	   equally	   at	   the	   events,	   this	   would	   indicate	   that	   9-­‐month-­‐olds	   already	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  divide	  two	  items	  equally	  between	  two	  potential	  recipients.	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Method	  
Participants	  Participants	  were	  48	  healthy	  full-­‐term	  9-­‐month-­‐olds,	  25	  male	  and	  23	  female	  (range	  =	  8	  months	  9	  days	  to	  9	  months	  23	  days,	  M	  =	  9	  months	  3	  days);	  16	  infants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	   to	   each	   condition.	   Another	   5	   infants	   were	   excluded	   because	   they	   looked	   the	  maximum	  time	  allowed	   in	   the	   test	   trials	   (4)	  or	  because	   the	  difference	   in	   the	   test	   looking	  times	  was	  over	  4.5	  standard	  deviations	  from	  the	  condition	  mean	  (1).	  	  
Apparatus	  and	  stimuli	  	   	  The	   apparatus	   consisted	   of	   a	   brightly	   lit	   display	   booth	   (201.5	   cm	   high	  ×	   102	   cm	  wide	  ×	  58	  cm	  deep)	  with	  a	  large	  opening	  (56	  cm	  ×	  95	  cm)	  in	  its	  front	  wall;	  between	  trials,	  the	   supervisor	   lowered	   a	   curtain	   in	   front	   of	   this	   opening.	   Inside	   the	   apparatus,	   the	   side	  walls	  were	  painted	  white,	  and	  the	  back	  wall	  and	  floor	  were	  covered	  with	  pastel	  adhesive	  paper.	  	   The	  experimenter	  wore	  a	  green	  shirt,	  knelt	  at	  a	  window	  (51	  cm	  ×	  38	  cm)	  in	  the	  right	  wall	   of	   the	   apparatus,	   and	   slid	   a	   curtain	   to	   open	   or	   close	   the	   window.	   Another	   curtain	  behind	  the	  experimenter	  hid	  the	  testing	  room.	  	   The	   two	   penguins	  were	   identical	   puppets	   (about	   22	   cm	  ×	   12	   cm	  ×	   9	   cm	   at	   their	  largest	  points)	  made	  of	  black	  and	  white	  furry	  fabric;	  each	  penguin	  had	  a	  large	  head	  with	  an	  orange	  beak.	  The	  penguins	  protruded	  from	  openings	  (each	  20	  cm	  ×	  12.5	  cm	  and	  filled	  with	  beige	   felt)	   located	  20	  cm	  apart	   in	   the	  back	  wall	  of	   the	  apparatus.	  Centered	  beneath	  each	  penguin	  was	   a	  white	   placemat	   (1	   cm	  ×	   20	   cm	  ×	   13	   cm).	   In	   the	   cover-­‐control	   condition,	  identical	  tan	  covers	  (each	  10	  cm	  ×	  22.5	  cm	  ×	  15.5	  cm,	  with	  a	  wooden	  knob	  at	  the	  top)	  stood	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over	  the	  placemats	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  test	  trial.	  	   The	  cookies	  were	  edible	  vanilla	  sandwich	  cookies	  (each	  about	  1	  cm	  ×	  3	  cm	  ×	  7	  cm).	  In	   the	   experimental	   and	   inanimate-­‐control	   conditions,	   the	   experimenter	   introduced	   the	  cookies	  on	  a	  beige	  ceramic	  plate	  (2.5	  cm	  x	  20	  cm	  in	  diameter).	  	  
Procedure	  	   Infants	   sat	   on	   a	   parent's	   lap	   centered	   in	   front	   of	   the	   apparatus;	   parents	   were	  instructed	   to	   remain	   silent	   and	   to	   close	   their	   eyes	   during	   the	   test	   trials.	   Each	   infant's	  looking	  behavior	  was	  monitored	  by	  two	  hidden	  naive	  observers;	  looking	  times	  during	  the	  initial	   and	   final	   phases	   of	   each	   trial	   were	   computed	   separately,	   using	   the	   primary	  observer's	   responses.	   Interobserver	   agreement	   (calculated	   for	   each	   trial	   by	   determining	  the	  proportion	  of	  100-­‐ms	  intervals	  in	  which	  the	  observers	  agreed)	  averaged	  93%	  per	  trial	  per	  infant.	  	   Infants	  were	  highly	  attentive	  during	  the	  initial	  phases	  of	  the	  familiarization	  and	  test	  trials;	  across	  conditions,	   they	   looked,	  on	  average,	   for	  95%	  of	  each	   initial	  phase.	  The	   final	  phase	   of	   each	   trial	   ended	  when	   infants	   (a)	   looked	   away	   for	   2	   consecutive	   seconds	   after	  having	  looked	  for	  at	   least	  5	  (familiarization)	  or	  6	  (test)	  cumulative	  seconds	  or	  (b)	   looked	  for	   a	   maximum	   of	   45	   cumulative	   seconds.	   Infants	   in	   all	   three	   conditions	   looked	   about	  equally	   during	   the	   final	   phase	   of	   the	   familiarization	   trial,	   F(2,	   45)	   =	   1.75,	   p	   =	   .186.	  Preliminary	  analyses	  of	  the	  final	  phases	  of	  the	  test	  trials	  revealed	  no	  significant	  interaction	  of	   condition	  and	  event	  with	   infant's	   sex,	  order	  of	   the	  events,	  which	  penguin	  received	   the	  first	   cookie,	   or	  which	   cover	  was	   lifted	   first	   (cover-­‐control	   condition	  only);	   the	  data	  were	  therefore	  collapsed	  across	  these	  latter	  four	  factors.	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Results	  Infants’	   looking	   times	   during	   the	   final	   phases	   of	   the	   test	   trials	   (Fig.	   4)	   were	  subjected	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   variance	   (ANOVA)	   with	   condition	   (experimental,	   inanimate-­‐control,	  or	  cover-­‐control)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	   factor	  and	  event	   (unequal	  or	  equal)	  as	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  factor.	  The	  analysis	  yielded	  only	  a	  significant	  Condition	  ×	  Event	  interaction,	  
F(1,	  45)	  =	  5.65,	  p	   =	   .007.	  Planned	   comparisons	   revealed	   that	   infants	   in	   the	   experimental	  condition	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  at	  the	  unequal	  (M	  =	  21.9,	  SD	  =	  10.8)	  than	  at	  the	  equal	  (M	  =	  14.0,	   SD	   =	   8.1)	   event,	   F(1,	   45)	   =	   14.41,	   p	   =	   .0004,	   Cohen's	   d	   =	   0.828;	   infants	   in	   the	  inanimate-­‐control	  condition	  looked	  about	  equally	  at	  the	  unequal	  (M	  =	  16.4,	  SD	  =	  11.1)	  and	  equal	   (M	   =	  17.6,	  SD	   =	  10.2)	  events,	  F(1,	  45)	  =	  0.29,	  d	   =	  –0.113;	  and	   infants	   in	   the	  cover-­‐control	  condition	  also	  looked	  about	  equally	  at	  the	  unequal	  (M	  =	  15.9,	  SD	  =	  9.8)	  and	  equal	  (M	  =	  16.0,	  SD	  =	  10.2)	  events,	  F(1,	  45)	  =	  0.002,	  d	  =	  –0.010.	  	  Examination	   of	   individual	   responses	   indicated	   that	   13/16	   infants	   in	   the	  experimental	   condition	   looked	   longer	   at	   the	   unequal	   event	   (cumulative	   binomial	  probability,	  p	  =	   .011),	  but	  only	  6/16	  infants	   in	  the	   inanimate-­‐control	  condition	  (p	  =	   .895)	  and	  7/16	  infants	  in	  the	  cover-­‐control	  condition	  (p	  =	   .773)	  did	  so.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  experimental	  condition	  and	  the	  two	  control	  conditions	  was	  reliable,	  p	  =	  .013	  (Fisher’s	  exact	  test).	  	  
Future	  Directions	  	   Could	   the	   infants	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   have	   detected	   a	   violation	   in	   the	  unequal	  event,	  not	  because	  the	  experimenter	  distributed	  the	  cookies	  unfairly,	  but	  because	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she	   interacted	  with	  only	  one	  of	   the	  penguins,	   and	   ignored	   the	  other?	  Could	   expectations	  about	   the	   social	   interactions	   (or	   lack	   thereof)	   of	   the	   experimenter	   with	   the	   potential	  recipients,	  rather	  than	  expectations	  about	  fairness,	  be	  driving	  the	  infants’	  responses?	  In	  the	  inanimate-­‐	   and	   cover-­‐control	   conditions	   no	   such	   expectations	   are	   present;	   in	   the	  inanimate-­‐control	  condition	  the	  infants	  looked	  equally	  regardless	  of	  how	  the	  experimenter	  distributed	  the	  cookies	  or	  who	  she	  interacted	  with	  and	  in	  the	  cover-­‐control	  condition,	  the	  experimenter	   interacted	  with	   both	   penguins	   (as	   she	   removed	   each	  penguin’s	   cover)	   and	  the	  infants	  again	  looked	  equally	  at	  both	  events.	  	  	   To	  examine	  this	  alternative	  interpretation	  of	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1,	  I	  will	  test	  additional	   infants	   in	   a	   new	   condition	   where	   the	   experimenter	   will	   engage	   in	   a	   social	  interaction	  with	  each	  potential	  recipient	  prior	  to	  distributing	  the	  cookies.	  In	  this	  modified-­‐experimental	  condition,	  the	  experimenter	  will	   first	   lift	  a	  cover	  in	  front	  of	  each	  penguin	  to	  reveal	   empty	   placemats	   underneath.	   The	   experimenter	   will	   then	   give	   a	   cookie	   to	   one	  penguin	  (which	  penguin	  receives	  a	  cookie	  first	  will	  be	  counterbalanced);	  in	  the	  equal	  event	  she	  will	  give	  the	  second	  cookie	  to	  the	  other	  penguin	  and	  in	  the	  unequal	  event	  she	  will	  give	  the	  second	  cookie	  to	  the	  same	  penguin	  (the	  order	  of	  the	  events	  will	  be	  counterbalanced).	  I	  plan	   to	   test	   an	   additional	   16	   infants	   in	   this	   condition.	   If	   infants	   in	   this	   condition	   look	  reliably	   longer	   at	   the	   unequal	   than	   at	   the	   equal	   event,	   this	   will	   not	   only	   replicate	   the	  findings	   from	   the	  experimental	   condition	  but	   it	  will	   also	  provide	  evidence	   that	  9-­‐month-­‐olds	   are	   responding	   to	   how	   the	   experimenter	   divides	   the	   cookies	   between	   the	   two	  penguins,	  rather	  than	  to	  whether	  she	  interacts	  with	  each	  penguin.	  	  	  
Discussion	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   The	   infants	   in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  expected	  the	  experimenter	  to	  divide	  the	  two	  cookies	  equally	  between	  the	   two	  penguins	  (and	  they	  will	  hopefully	  display	   the	  same	  expectation	   in	   the	  modified-­‐experimental	   condition).	   This	   expectation	   was	   absent	   when	  the	   penguins	  were	   inanimate	   (inanimate-­‐control	   condition),	   and	  when	   the	   experimenter	  simply	   removed	   covers	   to	   reveal	   the	   cookies	   (cover-­‐control	   condition).	   Together,	   the	  results	  from	  these	  four	  conditions	  should	  provide	  robust	  evidence	  that	  9-­‐month-­‐old	  infants	  already	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  divide	  resources	  equally	  between	  two	  similar	  individuals.	  
	  2.2	  EXPERIMENT	  2	  (4-­‐MONTH-­‐OLDS)	  	  
	   To	   further	   test	   the	   early-­‐emergence	   hypothesis,	   Experiment	   2	   examines	   4-month-
olds with a two-item one-distributor task similar to that used in Experiment 1 (with puppet 
Elmos instead of penguins). Infants were tested in the same three conditions used in Experiment 
1: an experimental, inanimate-control, and cover-control condition. If infants as young as 4 
months have an expectation of fairness, they should again look reliably longer when the 
experimenter gives two items to one Elmo and none to the other than when the experimenter 
divides the items equally, when the Elmos move and talk but not when the Elmos are inert or 
when covers are lifted to simply reveal the cookies underneath. Such findings would provide the 
strongest evidence, to date, that an expectation of fairness emerges early in human development. 	   
	  
Design	  	   Although	  the	  complete	  design	  of	  Experiment	  2	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  Experiment	  1,	   I	  began	  by	   testing	   infants	   in	   the	  experimental	   condition	   to	   see	   if	   4-­‐month-­‐olds	  would	  hold	  any	  expectations	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  objects.	   Infants	  (Fig.	  5)	  received	  one	  recipient-­‐
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familiarization	  trial,	  one	  experimenter-­‐familiarization	  trial	  and	  one	  test	  trial;	  each	  trial	  had	  an	   initial	   and	   a	   final	   phase.	   While	   piloting	   this	   experiment	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   infants	  needed	   an	   additional	   familiarization	   trial	   and	   that	   the	   effect	   was	   in	   the	   first	   test	   trial,	  therefore	  infants	  in	  this	  experiment	  received	  an	  experimenter-­‐familiarization	  (in	  addition	  to	  a	  recipient-­‐familiarization)	  and	  only	  one	  test	  trial	  instead	  of	  two	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  	  	  The	  recipient-­‐familiarization	  trial	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  in	  Experiment	  1;	  each	  Elmo	  “danced”	  for	  12	  seconds	  and	  then	  paused	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  During	  the	  initial	  (6-­‐s)	  phase	  of	   the	   experimenter-­‐familiarization	   trial,	   a	   female	   experimenter	   opened	   a	   curtained	  window	  in	  the	  right	  wall	  of	  the	  apparatus	  and	  brought	  in	  a	  plate	  with	  two	  identical	  cookies	  (the	  Elmos	  were	  not	  present	  in	  the	  apparatus).	  The	  experimenter	  set	  the	  plate	  of	  cookies	  down	  on	  the	  apparatus	   floor,	  placed	  her	  hands	  on	  the	  window	  ledge,	   looked	  down	  at	   the	  plate	  and	  paused.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  trial,	  infants	  watched	  this	  paused	  scene	  until	  the	   trial	  ended.	  Since	   infants	   in	   this	  study	  were	  much	  younger	   than	   in	  Experiment	  1,	   the	  added	  experimenter-­‐familiarization	  trial	  served	  to	  introduce	  the	  experimenter	  (in	  addition	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Elmos	  in	  the	  recipient-­‐familiarization	  trial).	  	  During	   the	   initial	   (27-­‐s)	  phase	  of	   the	   test	   trial,	   the	  Elmos	  danced	  until	   the	   female	  experimenter	   opened	   her	   window;	   the	   Elmos	   then	   turned	   toward	   the	   experimenter,	   as	  though	   to	   observe	   her	   actions.	   The	   experimenter	   brought	   in	   a	   plate	   with	   two	   identical	  cookies	  and	  announced,	  “I	  have	  cookies!”;	  the	  Elmos	  responded	  simultaneously,	  “Yay,	  yay!”.	  Next,	  the	  experimenter	  placed	  one	  cookie	  on	  the	  placemat	  in	  front	  of	  one	  Elmo;	  which	  Elmo	  received	  the	  first	  cookie	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  infants.	  The	  experimenter	  then	  placed	  the	  other	  cookie	  in	  front	  of	  either	  the	  same	  Elmo	  (unequal	  event)	  or	  the	  other	  Elmo	  (equal	  event);	  each	  infant	  saw	  only	  one	  test	  event.	  Finally,	   the	  experimenter	   left	  with	  her	  empty	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plate,	  and	  the	  Elmos	   looked	  down	  at	  their	  placemats.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  each	  trial,	  the	  Elmos	  tilted	  very	  gently	  side	  to	  side	  (while	  continuing	  to	  look	  down	  at	  their	  placemats),	  and	  the	  infants	  watched	  this	  scene	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  The	  movement	  of	  the	  Elmos	  served	  to	  maintain	  the	  infants’	  attention,	  since	  they	  were	  so	  young.	  	  Additional	   infants	  were	   tested	   in	   an	   inanimate-­‐control	   condition,	  which	   served	   to	  rule	  out	   low-­‐level	   interpretations	   such	  as	  baseline	  preferences	   for	  asymmetrical	  displays	  or	   for	  displays	   involving	   two	   cookies	  placed	   side	  by	   side.	   Infants	   saw	  events	   identical	   to	  those	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   except	   that	   the	   Elmos	   were	   inanimate:	   they	   never	  moved	  or	  talked,	  but	  simply	  faced	  forward	  resting	  on	  hidden	  posts.	  	  Finally,	   the	   cover-­‐control	   condition	   served	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   infants	  merely	   expected	   similar	   individuals	   to	   have	   similar	   numbers	   of	   objects.	   The	   recipient-­‐familiarization	  trial	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition,	  with	  the	  animated	  Elmos.	   Infants	   then	   received	   a	   cover-­‐familiarization	   trial,	   to	   introduce	   them	   to	   the	   cover	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  knew	  it	  was	  cover	  (and	  not	  a	  block,	  for	  instance).	  During	  the	  initial	  (11-­‐s)	  phase,	  the	  experimenter	  entered	  the	  stage,	  grasped	  the	  cover	  (the	  cover	  was	  already	  centered	   on	   the	   apparatus	   floor	   when	   the	   experimenter	   entered)	   and	   then	   lifted	   and	  rotated	  it	  toward	  the	  infant,	  so	  that	  the	  infant	  could	  see	  inside.	  During	  the	  final	  phase,	  the	  experimenter	  picked	  up	   the	  cover,	   rotated	   it	   towards	   the	  baby	  and	  then	  set	   it	  back	   in	   its	  original	  position;	  she	  then	  repeated	  these	  actions	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  In	  the	  initial	  (26-­‐s)	  phase	   of	   the	   test	   trial,	   instead	   of	   bringing	   in	   and	   distributing	   the	   two	   cookies,	   the	  experimenter	  removed	  covers	  resting	  over	  the	  Elmos’	  placemats	  to	  reveal	  the	  cookies;	  the	  covers	   were	   removed	   one	   at	   a	   time,	   with	   order	   counterbalanced	   across	   infants.	   The	  experimenter	  did	  not	  speak	  in	  this	  condition,	  but	  the	  Elmos	  greeted	  her	  (“Yay,	  yay!”)	  as	  she	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arrived.	   In	   the	   unequal	   event,	   the	   covers	   were	   removed	   to	   reveal	   two	   cookies	   on	   one	  placemat	  and	  none	  on	  the	  other;	  in	  the	  equal	  event,	  the	  covers	  were	  removed	  to	  reveal	  one	  cookie	   on	   each	   placemat.	   After	   the	   experimenter	   left,	   the	   penguins	   looked	   down	   and	  paused,	  as	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition.	  	  	   We	   reasoned	   that	   if	   infants	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   who	   saw	   the	   unequal	  event	   look	   reliably	   longer	   than	   infants	   who	   saw	   the	   equal	   event,	   but	   infants	   in	   the	  inanimate-­‐	  and	  cover-­‐control	   conditions	   look	  equally	   regardless	  of	  which	  event	   they	   see,	  this	  will	   indicate	  that	   infants	  as	  young	  as	  4	  months	  of	  age	  already	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  divide	  two	  items	  equally	  between	  two	  potential	  recipients.	  	  	  
Method	  
Participants	  Participants	  were	  50	  healthy	  full-­‐term	  4-­‐month-­‐olds,	  23	  male	  and	  26	  female	  (range	  =	  3	  months	  21	  days	  to	  5	  months	  18	  days,	  M	  =	  4	  months	  23	  days);	  18	  infants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  experimental	  and	  inanimate-­‐control	  conditions	  and	  14	  to	  the	  cover-­‐control	  condition.	  Another	  17	  infants	  were	  excluded	  because	  they	  were	  inattentive	  (3),	  distracted	  (1),	  or	  looked	  the	  maximum	  time	  allowed	  in	  the	  test	  trials	  (13),	  	  	  
Apparatus	  and	  stimuli	  The	   apparatus	   and	   stimuli	  were	   identical	   to	   those	   used	   in	   Experiment	   1	  with	   the	  exception	  of	  the	  puppets,	  which	  were	  two	  identical	  Elmo	  puppets	  (about	  28	  cm	  ×	  12	  cm	  ×	  24.5	  cm	  at	  their	  largest	  points)	  made	  of	  red	  furry	  fabric;	  each	  Elmo	  has	  a	  large	  head	  with	  large	  eyes.	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Procedure	  	   The	   procedure	   was	   identical	   to	   that	   used	   in	   Experiment	   1.	   Infants	   were	   highly	  attentive	   during	   the	   initial	   phases	   of	   the	   recipient-­‐familiarization,	   experimenter-­‐familiarization	  and	  test	  trials.	  The	  final	  phase	  of	  each	  trial	  ended	  when	  infants	  (a)	   looked	  away	   for	   2	   (familiarization	   trials)	   or	   0.5	   (test	   trials)	   consecutive	   seconds	   after	   having	  looked	   for	  at	   least	  5	   (familiarizations)	  or	  8	   (test)	   cumulative	   seconds	  or	   (b)	   looked	   for	  a	  maximum	   of	   60	   cumulative	   seconds	   (familiarization	   1)	   or	   35	   cumulative	   seconds	  (familiarization	  2	  and	  test).	  Infants	  in	  all	  three	  conditions	  looked	  about	  equally	  during	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  recipient-­‐familiarization	  trial,	  F(2,	  47)	  =	  2.30,	  p	  =	  .111;	  	  and	  infants	  in	  the	  experimental	  and	  inanimate-­‐control	  conditions	  looked	  about	  equally	  during	  the	  final	  phase	  of	   the	   experimenter-­‐familiarization	   trial,	   F(1,	   34)	   =	   3.41,	   p	   =	   .073	   (infants	   in	   the	   cover-­‐control	  condition	  saw	  different	  actions	  in	  the	  cover-­‐familiarization	  trial	  and	  therefore	  their	  looking	  times	  could	  not	  be	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  infants	  in	  the	  experimental	  and	  inanimate-­‐control	  conditions).	  Finally,	  preliminary	  analyses	  of	   the	  final	  phase	  of	   the	  test	   trial	  reveal	  no	  significant	  interaction	  of	  condition	  and	  event	  with	  infant's	  sex,	  which	  Elmo	  received	  the	  first	   cookie,	   or	  which	   cover	  was	   lifted	   first	   (cover-­‐control	   condition	  only);	   the	  data	  were	  therefore	  collapsed	  across	  these	  latter	  three	  factors.	  	  
Results	  
	   Infants’	  looking	  times	  during	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  test	  trial	  (Fig.	  6)	  were	  subjected	  to	  an	  ANOVA	  with	  condition	  (experimental,	  inanimate-­‐control,	  or	  cover-­‐control)	  and	  event	  (unequal	   or	   equal)	   as	   between	   subject	   factors.	   The	   analysis	   yielded	   only	   a	   significant	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Condition	  x	  Event	  interaction,	  F(2,	  44)	  =	  3.17,	  p	  =	  .052.	  Planned	  comparisons	  revealed	  that	  infants	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   who	   saw	   the	   unequal	   event	   (M	  =	   20.2,	   SD	   =	   6.2)	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event	  (M	  =	  11.9,	  SD	  =	  3.4),	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  6.95,	   p	   =	   .012;	   infants	   in	   the	   inanimate-­‐control	   condition	   looked	   about	   equally	   whether	  they	  saw	  the	  unequal	  (M	  =	  14.1,	  SD	  =	  8.3)	  or	  equal	  (M	  =	  14.9,	  SD	  =	  8.1)	  event,	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  0.07,	   p	   =	   .793,	   	   and	   infants	   in	   the	   cover-­‐control	   condition	   also	   looked	   about	   equally	  regardless	   of	   if	   they	   saw	   the	  unequal	   (M	  =	  15.9,	   SD	  =	  4.5)	   or	   equal	   (M	  =	  18.2,	   SD	  =	  7.4)	  event,	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  2.85,	  p	  =	  .098.	  	  
	   	  
Discussion	  Consistent	  with	  the	  results	  from	  Experiment	  1,	  infants	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  expected	  the	  experimenter	  to	  divide	  the	  two	  cookies	  equally	  between	  the	  two	  Elmos	  and	  were	  surprised	  when	  they	  did	  not.	  However	  this	  expectation	  did	  not	  hold	  when	  the	  Elmos	  were	   inanimate	   objects	   (inanimate-­‐control	   condition)	   or	   when	   the	   experimenter	   simply	  removed	  covers	  to	  reveal	  the	  cookies	  (cover-­‐control	  condition).	  Together,	  the	  results	  from	  these	   three	   conditions	   provide	   strong	   evidence	   that	   even	   infants	   as	   young	   as	   4	  months	  already	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  divide	  resources	  equally	  between	  two	  similar	  individuals.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  	   The	  present	  results	  with	  9-­‐and	  4-­‐month-­‐olds	  are	   important	   for	   two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  methodological	  assessment	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life.	  Specifically,	  our	  results	  indicate	  that	  young	  infants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reveal	  an	  expectation	  of	  fairness	  when	  tested	  with	  one-­‐	  as	  opposed	  to	  two-­‐distributor	  tasks	  (Geraci	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&	  Surian,	  2011)	  and	  with	   two-­‐	  as	  opposed	   to	   four-­‐item	  distributions	   (Sommerville	  et	   al.,	  2013).	  A	  two-­‐item	  distribution	  may	  be	  less	  challenging	  either	  because	  it	  requires	  keeping	  track	  of	   fewer	   items	  or	  because	   it	   allows	  a	   some-­‐versus-­‐none	  distinction:	   in	   the	  unequal	  allocation,	  one	  individual	  gets	  some	  resources	  whereas	  the	  other	  individual	  gets	  none,	  and	  this	  simple	  2:0	  contrast	  may	  be	  easier	  to	  detect	  as	  a	  fairness	  violation	  than	  a	  3:1	  contrast,	  where	  each	  individual	  gets	  at	  least	  some	  resources.	  Future	  research	  can	  evaluate	  these	  two	  possibilities	  by	  testing	  young	  infants	  with	  2:2	  and	  4:0	  allocations.	  	  	   Second,	   the	   present	   results	   bear	   on	   theoretical	   accounts	   of	   the	   developmental	  origins	  of	  fairness.	  Researchers	  from	  various	  disciplines	  within	  the	  cognitive	  sciences	  have	  speculated	   that	  a	   concern	   for	   fairness	   is	  part	  of	  humans’	  evolved	  adaptation	   for	   intuitive	  moral	  reasoning	  (e.g.,	  Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2007;	  Jackendoff,	  2007;	  Premack,	  2007;	  Sigmund	  et	  al.,	  2002),	  and	  the	  positive	  evidence	  reported	  here	  that	  infants	  as	  young	  as	  4	  months	  of	  age	  already	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  act	  fairly	  is	  consistent	  with	  these	  speculations.	  This	  evidence	  also	   gives	   weight	   to	   the	   possibility	   that,	   in	   some	   situations	   at	   least,	   young	   infants’	  responses	   to	   fair	   and	   unfair	   distributors	   rest	   on	  moral,	   as	   opposed	   to	  merely	   affiliative,	  evaluations	   (Geraci	   &	   Surian,	   2011;	  Meristo	   &	   Surian,	   2013).	   If	   young	   infants	   possess	   a	  sense	  of	   fairness,	   then	   they	  may	   regard	  an	  unfair	  distributor	  not	  only	  as	  a	   less	  desirable	  affiliate	  but	  also	  as	  a	  moral	  violator	  who	  should	  incur	  punishment.	  	  In	  sum,	  these	  results	  indicate	  that	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  already	  expect	  fair	  allocations,	   providing	   new	   evidence	   that	   expectations	   about	   how	   individuals	   should	   act	  toward	   others	   emerge	   early	   in	   human	   life	   (Baillargeon	   et	   al.,	   2015).	   These	   results	   are	  consistent	  with	   a	   principle-­‐based	   approach	   and	   suggest	   that	   as	   humans	  we	   come	   to	   the	  world	   already	   equipped	  with	   the	   flexible	   cognitive	   architecture	   necessary	   to	   understand	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the	  social	  world	  around	  us.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
EXPECTATIONS	  OF	  FAIRNESS	  AND	  INGROUP	  LOYALTY	  IN	  19-­‐MONTH-­‐OLDS	  	   The	  abundance	  of	  intergroup	  conflict	  that	  has	  plagued	  our	  world	  historically	  and	  in	  modern	  times	  has	  motivated	  decades	  of	  research	  in	  developmental	  and	  social	  psychology	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  origins	  and	  development	  of	  ingroup	  and	  intergroup	  biases.	  Within	  this	  broad	  area	  of	  research,	  two	  broad	  questions	  have	  been:	  1)	  what	  are	  the	  necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   to	   elicit	   ingroup	   favoritism	   in	   children	   and,	   2)	  when	  and	  how	  do	  children	  begin	  to	  show	  such	  favoritism.	  	  	   Studies	   on	   ingroup/outgroup	   expectations	   have	   typically	   utilized	   two	   kinds	   of	  groups;	   real	   groups	   that	   exist	   in	   the	  world	   like	   race	  and	  gender	   (e.g.,	  Banaji	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  Bar-­‐Haim	   et	   al.,	   2006)	   or	   novel,	   arbitrary	   groups	   (i.e.,	  minimal	   groups)	   that	   are	   created	  only	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   particular	   study	   (e.g.,	   Bigler,	   Jones	  &	   Lobliner,	   1997;	   Dunham,	  Baron	  &	  Carey,	  2011;	  Tajfel,	  1982).	  Race	  and	  gender	  have	  likely	  been	  the	  most	  studied	  real	  groups;	   however,	   there	   are	   many	   studies	   that	   have	   used	   ethnicity	   and	   religion	   (e.g.,	  Birnbaum,	  Deeb,	  Segall,	  Ben-­‐Eliyahu	  &	  Diesendruck,	  2010),	  kin	  (e.g,.	  Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008)	  friends	  (e.g.,	  Moore,	  2009;	  Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008;	  Vaughan,	  Tajfel	  &	  Williams,	  1981)	  as	  well	  as	   language	   and	   accent	   (e.g.,	   Kinzler	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   as	   markers	   of	   group	   membership.	  Minimal	  groups,	   in	  contrast,	  do	  not	  exist	  outside	  of	  a	  particular	  study	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	  created	  intentionally.	  One	  way	  researchers	  often	  create	  minimal	  groups	  is	  by	  randomly	  assigning	  participants	  one	  of	  two	  colored	  shirts	  (e.g.,	  to	  create	  a	  red	  team	  and	  a	  blue	  team).	  Researchers	  who	  want	   to	   create	   completely	   random	  groups	  might	  have	  an	  experimenter	  conceal	  a	  small	  object	   in	  each	  of	  her	  hands,	  corresponding	   to	   the	  color	  of	  each	  shirt,	  and	  then	  ask	  participants	  to	  choose	  a	  hand	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  an	  object	  that	  matches	  one	  of	  the	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tee	  shirt	  colors	  (e.g.,	  Dunham,	  Baron	  &	  Carey,	  2011).	  Minimal	  groups	  can	  also	  be	  formed	  by	  assigning	  tee	  shirt	  color	  according	  to	  non-­‐informative	  biological	  features	  such	  as	  hair	  color	  (e.g.,	  Bigler,	  Jones	  &	  Lobliner,	  1997).	  Additional	  variables	  including	  the	  perceptual	  salience	  of	   the	   groups	   and	  whether	   or	   not	   the	   groups	   are	   competitively	   primed	   also	   vary	   across	  studies.	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  measure	   ingroup	  biases	   in	  children,	  researchers	  have	  used	  a	  variety	  of	  methods,	   including:	   assessing	   their	   explicit	   preferences	   for	   ingroup	   versus	   outgroup	  members	   (e.g.,	   Kinzler	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Patterson	   &	   Bigler,	   2006),	   looking	   at	   how	   children	  distribute	   resources	   to	   ingroup	  versus	  outgroup	  members	   (e.g.,	  Dunham,	  Baron	  &	  Carey,	  2011;	  Lerner,	  1974;	  Moore,	  2009;	  Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008;	  Spielman,	  2000;	  Vaughan,	  Tajfel	  &	  Williams,	   1981),	   assessing	   which	   types	   of	   behaviors	   they	   attribute	   to	   ingroup	   versus	  outgroup	  members	  (e.g.,	  “	  who	  gave	  their	  friend	  a	  new	  toy”	  versus	  “	  who	  took	  some	  cookies	  without	  asking”	  )	   (e.g.,	  Dunham,	  Baron	  &	  Carey,	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  assessing	  their	   implicit	  attitudes	  towards	  ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  members	  (e.g.,	  Banaji	  et	  al..	  2007;	  Dunham,	  Baron	  &	   Carey,	   2011).	   The	   duration	   of	   time	   children	   spend	   exposed	   to	   an	   intergroup	   situation	  also	  varies,	  lasting	  anywhere	  from	  one	  test	  session	  (e.g.,	  Banaji	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  to	  as	  long	  as	  4	  weeks	  (e.g.,	  Bigler,	  Jones	  &	  Lobliner,	  1997).	  	  	   The	  most	   consistent	   finding	   from	   these	   and	   similar	   studies	   is	   that	   children	   from	  ages	  3	   to	  10	  show	   favoritism	   toward	   ingroup	  members	   regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  group	  is	  a	  real	  group	  or	  a	  minimal	  group;	  this	  finding	  holds	  across	  the	  different	  studies	  and	  methods	   described	   above.	   Of	   particular	   relevance	   to	   my	   purpose	   here,	   many	   of	   these	  studies	  have	   looked	  specifically	  at	  how	  group	  membership	  affects	  children’s	  expectations	  about	   the	  distribution	  of	   resources.	   For	   example,	  when	   resources	   are	   scarce,	   children	   as	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young	  as	  3.5	  years	  will	  give	  more	  to	  friends	  and	  family	  than	  to	  strangers	  (Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008).	  When	  sharing	  resources	  has	  a	  cost	  to	  the	  child	  (i.e.,	  choosing	  between	  a	  “one	  for	  me,	  one	   for	  you”	  or	   “two	   for	  me,	  none	   for	  you”	  allocation)	  4.5-­‐year-­‐olds	  will	  choose	   the	  (1,1)	  allocation	   when	   the	   recipient	   is	   a	   friend	   but	   will	   choose	   the	   (2,0)	   allocation	   when	   the	  recipient	  is	  a	  stranger	  or	  non-­‐friend	  (Moore,	  2009).	  When	  4-­‐to	  10-­‐year-­‐olds	  who	  complete	  an	  assigned	  task	  with	  varying	  levels	  of	  success	  are	  given	  rewards	  and	  must	  determine	  how	  to	   best	   divide	   them,	   they	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   divide	   the	   rewards	   equally	   the	   longer	   they	  remain	  in	  close	  proximity	  (Gerson	  &	  Damon,	  1978).	  And	  three-­‐year-­‐olds	  who	  have	  to	  work	  together	  in	  order	  to	  access	  a	  reward	  will	  share	  the	  reward	  equally	  (Warneken	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  	   With	   the	  exception	  of	  Olson	  and	  Spelke	   (2008),	   these	  studies	  have	   largely	  utilized	  first-­‐party	   situations	   where	   the	   children	   themselves	   are	   potential	   recipients.	   However,	  given	  that	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  life	  are	  already	  sensitive	  to	  issues	  of	  fairness	  in	  third-­‐party	   situations	   (Chapter	   2),	   here	   I	   ask	   whether	   infants	   in	   the	   second	   year	   of	   life	  display	   expectations	   of	   fairness	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   resources	   in	   third-­‐party	  situations	   involving	   different	   groups.	   In	   Experiment	   3,	   I	   explore	   the	   possibility	   that	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	  think	  fairness	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  ingroup	  and	  may	  have	  no	  expectation	  when	  a	  member	  of	  one	  group	  divides	  resources	  between	  two	  individuals	  who	  belong	  to	  a	  different	  group.	   In	  Experiment	  4	  and	  5,	   I	   ask	  whether	  expectations	  of	   fairness	   can	  be	  modified	  by	  group	  membership;	  will	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expect	  a	  member	  of	  one	  group	  to	  favor	  his	  ingroup	  member	  when	  distributing	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  resources	  between	  an	  ingroup	  member	  and	  an	  outgroup	   individual	   (i.e.,	  when	   there	  are	  only	   two	  objects	  and	   two	   ingroup	  members)	  (Experiment	  4)?	  What	  if	  there	  are	  adequate	  resources	  for	  all	  participants	  (i.e.,	  three	  objects	  and	   two	   ingroup	   members	   and	   one	   outgroup	   individual)	   (Experiment	   5)?	   	   Finally,	   in	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Experiment	  6	  I	  ask	  if	  19-­‐month	  olds	  view	  an	  equal	  distribution	  as	  acceptable	  (regardless	  of	  group	  membership)	  whenever	  there	  are	  sufficient	  resources	  for	  all	  participants?	  Or	  do	  they	  view	  an	  equal	  distribution	  as	  unacceptable	  even	  when	  resources	  are	  ample,	  if	  the	  resources	  are	  needed	  to	  complete	  a	  task?	  	  	  3.1	  EXPERIMENT	  3	  In	   Experiment	   3,	   I	   ask	   whether	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	   expect	   fairness	   to	   apply	   when	   a	  member	   of	   one	   group	   distributes	   objects	   to	   two	  members	   of	   a	   different	   group.	   	   I	   tested	  infants	  using	  different	  animal	  puppets	  to	  represent	  ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  individuals	  in	  a	  third-­‐party	   distribution	   task:	   a	  monkey	   or	   giraffe	   puppet	   divided	   two	   cookies	   equally	   or	  unequally	  between	  two	  giraffe	  or	   two	  monkey	  puppets	  (Fig.	  7).	   In	  each	  of	   two	  test	   trials,	  the	   infants	   saw	   either	   an	   unequal	   distribution	   (unequal	   event)	   or	   an	   equal	   distribution	  (equal	  event)	  (each	  infant	  saw	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  event	  across	  both	  trials).	  Each	  trial	  had	  an	  initial	  and	  a	   final	  phase.	  During	   the	   initial	   (31-­‐s)	  phase,	   two	  giraffe	   (or	  monkey)	  puppets	  protruded	   from	  openings	   in	   the	  back	  wall	   of	   the	   apparatus	   and	   “danced”	  back	   and	   forth	  several	  times	  (half	  of	  the	  infants	  saw	  giraffe	  recipients	  and	  half	  saw	  monkey	  recipients	  but	  we	  use	   the	  giraffe	   recipients	   for	  ease	  of	  description).	  A	  monkey	  (or	  giraffe)	   then	  entered	  the	   stage	   through	   a	   fringe-­‐covered	   window	   in	   the	   right	   wall	   of	   the	   apparatus	   and	   the	  giraffes	  turned	  toward	  the	  monkey,	  as	  though	  to	  observe	  his	  actions	  (half	  of	  the	  infants	  saw	  a	   monkey	   distributor	   and	   half	   saw	   a	   giraffe	   distributor,	   but	   we	   again	   use	   the	   monkey	  distributor	   for	   ease	   of	   description).	   The	   monkey	   brought	   in	   a	   tray	   with	   two	   identical	  objects	   (toy	  ducks	   or	   edible	   cookies)	   and	   announced,	   “I	   have	   toys/cookies!”;	   the	   giraffes	  responded	  by	  saying,	  “Yay,	  yay!”	  in	  two	  distinct	  voices,	  while	  dancing	  back	  and	  forth.	  Next	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the	  monkey	  placed	  one	  object	  in	  front	  of	  one	  giraffe	  and	  then	  he	  placed	  the	  second	  object	  in	  front	   of	   the	   same	   giraffe	   (unequal	   event)	   or	   in	   front	   of	   the	   other	   giraffe	   (equal	   event).	  Finally,	   the	   monkey	   left,	   and	   the	   recipient	   giraffes	   looked	   down	   at	   their	   placemats	   and	  paused.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  trial,	  infants	  watched	  this	  paused	  scene	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  	  	   If	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  think	  fairness	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  ingroup,	  then	  infants	  who	  see	  a	  monkey	   puppet	   divide	   two	   objects	   between	   two	   giraffe	   puppets	   might	   look	   equally	  whether	   the	  monkey	  divides	   the	  objects	  equally	  or	  unequally	   (i.e.,	   for	  a	  monkey,	   fairness	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  giraffes).	  However,	  if	  fairness	  does	  apply	  when	  both	  potential	  recipients	  belong	  to	  a	  different	  group,	  then	  infants	  should	  look	  reliably	  longer	  at	  the	  unequal	  than	  at	  the	  equal	  event.	  	  
Method	  
Participants	  Participants	  were	  18	  healthy	  full-­‐term	  19-­‐month-­‐olds,	  8	  male	  and	  10	  female	  (range	  =	  18	  months	  23	  days	  to	  19	  months	  28	  days,	  M	  =	  19	  months	  8	  days).	  Half	  of	  the	  infants	  were	  randomly	   assigned	   to	   each	   event.	   Another	   2	   infants	   were	   excluded	   because	   they	   were	  distracted	  (1)	  or	  overly	  active	  (1).	  	  	  
Apparatus	  and	  stimuli	   	  The	  apparatus	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  used	  in	  previous	  experiments.	  The	  distributor-­‐puppet	  was	   either	   a	  monkey	  puppet	   (about	   26	   cm	  x	  18	   cm	  x	  13	   cm	  at	   its	   largest	   point)	  made	  of	  brown	  fabric	  or	  a	  giraffe	  puppet	  (about	  26	  cm	  x	  15	  cm	  x	  11	  cm	  at	  its	  largest	  point)	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made	   of	   beige	   and	   brown	   fabric.	   The	   distributor-­‐puppet	   entered	   the	   stage	   through	   a	  fringed	  curtain	  in	  the	  right	  wall	  of	  the	  apparatus.	  	  The	  recipients	  were	  two	  monkey	  puppets	  or	  two	  giraffe	  puppets	  (and	  both	  animals	  were	   identical	   to	   the	   distributor	   puppets	   described	   above).	   The	   recipient-­‐puppets	  protruded	  from	  openings	  (each	  20	  cm	  x	  12.5	  cm	  and	  filled	  with	  beige	  felt)	   located	  20	  cm	  apart	   in	   the	   back	   wall	   of	   the	   apparatus.	   Centered	   beneath	   each	   recipient-­‐puppet	   was	   a	  white	  placemat	  (1	  cm	  x	  20	  cm	  x	  13	  cm).	  	  The	  two	  pairs	  of	   identical	   items	  used	   in	  the	  trials	  were	  purple	  toy	  ducks	  or	  edible	  brown	  cookies.	  The	  distributor-­‐puppet	  introduced	  the	  items	  on	  a	  round	  blue	  tray	  (1.5	  cm	  high,	  17	  cm	  in	  diameter).	  	  	  
Procedure	  	   Infants	   sat	   on	   a	   parent’s	   lap	   centered	   in	   front	   of	   the	   apparatus;	   parents	   were	  instructed	   to	   remain	   silent	   and	   to	   close	   their	   eyes	   during	   the	   test	   trials.	   Each	   infant’s	  looking	  behavior	  was	  monitored	  by	  two	  hidden	  naïve	  observers;	  looking	  times	  during	  the	  initial	   and	   final	   phases	   of	   each	   trial	   were	   computed	   separately,	   using	   the	   primary	  observer’s	   responses.	   Interobserver	   agreement	   (calculated	   for	   each	   trial	   by	   determining	  the	  proportion	  of	  100-­‐ms	  intervals	  in	  which	  the	  observers	  agreed)	  averaged	  94%	  per	  trial	  per	  infant.	  	  	   Infants	  were	   highly	   attentive	   during	   the	   initial	   phases	   of	   the	   test	   trials.	   The	   final	  phase	  of	  each	  trial	  ended	  when	  the	  infant	  (a)	  looked	  away	  for	  2	  consecutive	  seconds	  after	  having	   looked	   for	   at	   least	   5	   cumulative	   seconds	   or	   (b)	   looked	   for	   a	   maximum	   of	   60	  cumulative	  seconds.	  Preliminary	  analyses	  of	  the	  final	  phases	  of	  the	  test	  trials	  revealed	  no	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significant	  interaction	  of	  event	  with	  infant’s	  sex,	  identity	  of	  distributor-­‐puppet	  (monkey	  or	  giraffe),	   or	   which	   recipient	   received	   an	   object	   first;	   the	   data	   were	   therefore	   collapsed	  across	  these	  latter	  three	  factors.	  	  	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  Infants’	   looking	   times	   during	   the	   final	   phases	   of	   the	   two	   test	   trials	   (Fig.	   9)	   were	  averaged	  and	  subjected	  to	  an	  ANOVA	  with	  event	  (unequal	  or	  equal)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor.	  The	  analysis	  yielded	  only	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  event,	  F(1,	  16)	  =	  7.41,	  p	  =	  .015,	  indicating	   that	   infants	  who	  saw	   the	  unequal	   event	   (M	  =	  28.5,	  SD	   =	  14.8)	   	   looked	   reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event	  (M	  =	  14.0,	  SD	  =	  6.1).	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  infants	  do	  have	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness	  in	  situations	  that	  involve	  both	  ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  individuals.	  Infants	  who	  saw	  the	  unequal	  event	  looked	  reliably	   longer	   than	   infants	  who	   saw	   the	   equal	   event,	  which	   indicates	   that	   infants	   apply	  fairness	  to	  outgroup	  individuals	  as	  well	  as	  ingroup	  members.	  The	  next	  important	  question	  to	   ask	   is:	  Will	   infants	  display	  different	   expectations	  when	  one	  of	   the	  potential	   recipients	  belongs	  to	  the	  same	  group	  as	  the	  distributor	  and	  the	  other	  potential	  recipient	  belongs	  to	  a	  different	  group?	  I	  address	  this	  question	  in	  Experiment	  4.	  	  	  3.2	  EXPERIMENT	  4	  	   Given	  that	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  3	  suggest	  that	  infants	  do	  apply	  fairness	  to	  both	  ingroup	   and	   outgroup	   individuals,	   here	   I	   explore	   if	   and	   how	   these	   expectations	   can	   be	  modified	  by	  group	  membership	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life.	  To	  address	  this	  question,	  I	  again	  tested	   19-­‐month-­‐old	   infants	   using	   different	   animal	   puppets	   to	   represent	   ingroup	   and	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outgroup	  individuals	  in	  a	  third-­‐party	  distribution	  task:	  a	  monkey	  or	  giraffe	  puppet	  divided	  two	  cookies	   either	   equally	  between	  another	  monkey	  and	  giraffe	  puppet	   (equal	   event)	  or	  the	  distributor	  puppet	  gave	  both	  cookies	  to	  his	  ingroup	  member	  (favors-­‐ingroup	  event)	  or	  both	  to	  the	  outgroup	  individual	  (favors-­‐outgroup	  event).	  If	  infants	  possess	  both	  an	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	  a	  fairness	  principle,	  they	  may	  view	  these	  events	  in	  several	  possible	  ways:	  1)	  if	  the	  fairness	  principle	  overrides	  the	  ingroup	  loyalty	  principle	  then	  infants	  should	  find	  both	  unequal	  distributions	  unexpected;	  2)	  if	  the	  ingroup	  loyalty	  principle	  overrides	  the	  fairness	  principle,	  then	  infants	  should	  expect	  the	  distributor	  to	  favor	  his	  ingroup	  member	  and	  view	  the	  other	  two	  events	  as	  unexpected;	  and	  3)	  if	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	  fairness	  are	  ranked	  about	  equally,	  then	  infants	  may	  view	  as	  unexpected	  only	  the	  event	  where	  the	  distributor	  favors	  the	  outgroup	  individual	  (this	  event	  violates	  both	  principles,	  whereas	  the	  other	  two	  events	  agree	   with	   one	   of	   the	   principles:	   the	   favors-­‐ingroup	   event	   with	   the	   ingroup	   loyalty	  principle,	   and	   the	   equal	   event	   with	   the	   fairness	   principle).	   It	   is	   also	   likely	   that	   learning	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	  here;	  even	   if	   infants	  come	  to	   the	  world	  with	  principles	  of	   ingroup	  loyalty	   and	   fairness,	   they	   still	   have	   to	   learn	   how	   their	   culture	   orders	   the	   principles	   in	  different	  situations.	  	  	  
Design	  In	  Experiment	  4,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  watched	  live	  events	  in	  which	  a	  puppet	  (monkey	  or	  giraffe)	   divided	   resources	   between	   two	   animated	   puppets,	   one	   monkey	   and	   one	   giraffe	  (Fig.	  8).	   In	  each	  of	   two	  test	   trials,	   the	   infants	  saw	  either	  an	  unequal	  distribution	   favoring	  the	  ingroup	  member	  (favors-­‐ingroup	  event),	  an	  unequal	  distribution	  favoring	  the	  outgroup	  member	   (favors-­‐outgroup	  event)	  or	   an	   equal	  distribution	   (equal	   event)	   (each	   infant	   saw	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only	  one	  kind	  of	  event	  in	  both	  trials).	  Each	  trial	  had	  an	  initial	  and	  a	  final	  phase.	  During	  the	  initial	   (31-­‐s)	   phase,	   one	   giraffe	   protruded	   from	   an	   opening	   in	   the	   back	   wall	   of	   the	  apparatus;	  the	  giraffe	  “danced”	  back	  and	  forth	  several	  times	  until	  a	  monkey	  puppet	  entered	  from	  a	  second	  opening	  in	  the	  back	  wall	  (next	  to	  the	  giraffe)	  and	  clapped	  several	  times;	  in	  front	  of	  each	  puppet	  was	  a	  small	  placemat.	  A	  second	  monkey	  (or	  giraffe;	   the	  distributing	  puppet	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  infants	  but	  we	  use	  the	  monkey	  distributor	  for	  ease	  of	  description)	   then	  entered	   the	  stage	   through	  a	   fringe-­‐covered	  window	   in	   the	  right	  wall	  of	  the	  apparatus	  and	  the	  puppets	  turned	  toward	  the	  monkey,	  as	  though	  to	  observe	  his	  actions.	  The	  monkey	  brought	  in	  a	  tray	  with	  two	  identical	  objects	  (toy	  ducks	  or	  edible	  cookies)	  and	  announced,	   “I	  have	   toys/cookies!”;	   the	  giraffe	  responded	   first	  by	  saying	   “Yay,	  yay!”	  while	  dancing	   back	   and	   forth;	   the	  monkey	   responded	   next	   by	   saying	   “Yay,	   yay!”	   in	   a	   different	  voice,	  while	  clapping	  his	  hands.	  Next	   the	  distributing	  monkey	  placed	  the	  objects	  one	  at	  a	  time	  on	  the	  placemat	  in	  front	  of	  the	  monkey	  (favors-­‐ingroup	  event),	  in	  front	  of	  the	  giraffe	  (favors-­‐outgroup	   event)	   or	   in	   front	   of	   both	   the	   monkey	   and	   giraffe	   (equal	   event;	   the	  distributing	   puppet	   always	   gave	   to	   his	   ingroup	   member	   first).	   Finally,	   the	   monkey	  distributor	  left,	  and	  the	  giraffe	  and	  monkey	  recipients	  looked	  down	  at	  their	  placemats	  and	  paused.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  trial,	  infants	  watched	  this	  paused	  scene	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  	  As	  stated	  above,	   if	   infants	  are	  sensitive	   to	  both	   ingroup	   loyalty	  and	   fairness	  by	  19	  months,	   then	   their	   expectations	   in	   each	   event	   will	   depend	   on	   how	   they	   apply	   each	  principle:	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  will	  expect	  only	  ingroup	  favoritism,	  only	  fairness,	  or	  they	  may	  show	  expectations	  of	  both	  if	  both	  principles	  carry	  about	  the	  same	  weight.	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Method	  
Participants	  	   Participants	   were	   27	   healthy	   full-­‐term	   19-­‐month-­‐olds,	   14	   male	   and	   13	   female	  (range	  =	  18	  months	  22	  days	  to	  19	  months	  29	  days,	  M	  =	  19	  months	  10	  days).	  Infants	  were	  randomly	  divided	  between	   the	   three	  events	   (equal,	   favors-­‐ingroup	  and	   favors-­‐outgroup).	  Another	  4	  infants	  were	  excluded	  because	  they	  were	  overly	  active	  or	  distracted	  (2)	  fussy	  (1)	  or	  because	  of	  parental	  interference	  during	  testing	  (1).	  	  	  
Apparatus	  and	  stimuli	   	  The	  apparatus	  and	  stimuli	  were	   identical	   to	   that	  used	   in	  Experiment	  3.	   	  Each	   test	  session	  was	  recorded,	  monitored	  and	  checked	  off-­‐line	  as	  in	  previous	  experiments.	  	  	  
Procedure	  	   The	   procedure	  was	   identical	   to	   that	   used	   in	   previous	   experiments.	   Interobserver	  agreement	  averaged	  95%	  per	  trial	  per	  infant.	  	  Infants	  were	   highly	   attentive	   during	   the	   initial	   phases	   of	   the	   test	   trials.	   The	   final	  phase	  of	  each	  trial	  ended	  when	  the	  infant	  (a)	  looked	  away	  for	  2	  consecutive	  seconds	  after	  having	   looked	   for	   at	   least	   5	   cumulative	   seconds	   or	   (b)	   looked	   for	   a	   maximum	   of	   60	  cumulative	  seconds.	  Preliminary	  analyses	  of	  the	  final	  phases	  of	  the	  test	  trials	  revealed	  no	  significant	  interaction	  of	  condition	  with	  infant’s	  sex,	  identity	  of	  distributor	  puppet	  (monkey	  or	  giraffe),	  or	  which	  recipient	  puppet	  (monkey	  or	  giraffe)	  was	  on	  each	  side;	  the	  data	  were	  therefore	  collapsed	  across	  these	  latter	  three	  factors.	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Results	  Infants’	   looking	   times	   during	   the	   final	   phases	   of	   the	   two	   test	   trials	   (Fig.	   9)	   were	  averaged	   and	   subjected	   to	   an	   ANOVA	   with	   event	   (favors-­‐ingroup,	   favors-­‐outgroup,	   or	  equal)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	   factor.	  The	  analysis	  yielded	  only	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  event,	  F(2,	  24)	  =	  4.82,	  p=.017.	  A	  planned	  contrast	  revealed	  that	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐outgroup	  event	  (M	  =	  29.3,	  SD	  =	  11.3)	  and	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event	  (M	  =	  28.3,	  SD	  =	  10.4)	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  (M	  =	  16.0,	  SD	  =	  8.4)	  F(1,	  24)	  =	  14.41,	  p	  <.001	  (the	  former	  two	  groups	  did	  not	  differ,	  F(1,	  24)=0.04,	  p	  =	  .843).	  	  
Discussion	  	  Infants	  viewed	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  as	  expected	  and	  the	  favors-­‐outgroup	  event	  as	  unexpected,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  did	  have	  some	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  ingroup	  loyalty	  principle.	  However,	  they	  also	  viewed	  the	  equal	  event	  as	  unexpected,	  which	  suggests	  that	  in	  this	  situation,	  they	  were	  ranking	  the	  ingroup	  loyalty	  principle	  above	  the	  fairness	  principle.	  One	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  when	  resources	  are	  limited	  (i.e.,	  there	  are	  only	  two	  toys/cookies	  for	  two	  monkeys),	  they	  must	  be	  saved	  for	  the	  ingroup.	  If	  this	  explanation	  is	  correct,	  then	  when	  there	  are	  enough	  resources	  for	  everyone	  (e.g.	  three	  toys/cookies;	  enough	  for	  each	  ingroup	  member	  as	  well	  as	  the	  outgroup	  individual),	  infants	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  surprised	  when	  the	  distributor	  gives	  objects	  to	  both	  an	  ingroup	  member	  and	  an	  outgroup	  individual.	  I	  explore	  this	  idea	  in	  Experiment	  5.	  	  	  3.3	  EXPERIMENT	  5	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Based	  on	  the	  findings	  from	  Experiment	  4,	  it	  seemed	  that	  at	  19	  months,	  infants	  rank	  ingroup	  loyalty	  over	  fairness.	  If	  they	  see	  a	  monkey	  dividing	  objects	  between	  a	  monkey	  and	  a	  giraffe,	  they	  expect	  the	  monkey	  to	  only	  give	  objects	  to	  the	  other	  monkey.	  In	  Experiment	  4	  there	  were	   only	   two	  objects	   and	   two	  monkeys	   (the	  monkey	  distributor	   and	   the	  monkey	  recipient)	   and	   one	   giraffe;	   therefore,	   infants	   might	   have	   reasoned	   that	   there	   were	   only	  enough	   objects	   for	   the	   monkeys	   (one	   each).	   However,	   what	   if	   the	   monkey	   distributor	  brought	   in	   three	   objects,	   instead	   of	   two,	   on	   his	   tray?	   	  Would	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	   now	   find	   it	  acceptable	  for	  the	  monkey	  distributor	  to	  give	  one	  of	  the	  objects	  to	  the	  giraffe	  recipient?	  To	  explore	  this	  question,	  I	  tested	  infants	  using	  the	  same	  procedure	  as	  in	  Experiment	  4	  except	  the	  distributor	  puppet	  entered	  the	  stage	  with	  three	  identical	  toys.	  The	  distributor	  gave	  one	  toy	   to	   each	   recipient	   (equal	   event),	   gave	   two	   toys	   to	   the	   outgroup	   individual	   (favors-­‐outgroup	   event),	   or	   gave	   two	   toys	   to	   his	   ingroup	  member	   (favors-­‐ingroup	   event);	   in	   all	  cases,	  the	  distributor	  kept	  the	  third	  toy	  for	  himself	  and	  left	  the	  stage	  with	  it.	  I	  reasoned	  that	  If	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	   always	   expect	   distributors	   to	   rank	   ingroup	   loyalty	   above	   fairness	   in	  distributing	  windfall	  resources,	  then	  results	  should	  be	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Experiment	  4:	  infants	  should	  look	  reliably	  longer	  if	  shown	  the	  favors-­‐outgroup	  or	  equal	  event	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	   event.	   However,	   if	   19-­‐month-­‐olds’	   expectations	   are	   sensitive	   to	   the	  abundance	  or	  scarcity	  of	  resources,	  then	  given	  that	  there	  were	  now	  enough	  objects	  for	  all	  three	  puppets,	  infants	  in	  Experiment	  5	  might	  now	  find	  an	  equal	  distribution	  acceptable.	  	  	  
Design	  In	   Experiment	   5,	   19-­‐month-­‐old	   infants	   watched	   events	   identical	   to	   those	   in	  Experiment	  4,	  except	   that	   the	  distributor	  brought	   in	   three	  objects	   instead	  of	  only	   two.	   In	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the	  equal	  event,	  the	  distributor	  puppet	  gave	  one	  toy	  to	  each	  of	  the	  recipient	  puppets	  (one	  monkey	  and	  one	  giraffe)	  and	   then	   took	   the	   third	   toy	  with	  him	  when	  he	   left.	   In	   the	  other	  events,	  the	  distributor	  gave	  two	  toys	  to	  the	  ingroup	  recipient	  (favors-­‐ingroup	  event)	  or	  to	  the	  outgroup	  recipient	  (favors-­‐outgroup	  event),	  and	  again	  took	  the	  remaining	  toy	  with	  him	  when	  he	   left	   the	  stage.	   	  There	  are	   three	  possible	  outcomes:	   infants	  might	   still	   expect	   the	  distributor	  to	  favor	  his	  ingroup;	  they	  might	  expect	  the	  distributor	  to	  be	  fair;	  or	  they	  might	  now	  view	  both	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	  fairness	  as	  acceptable.	  If	  the	  latter	  outcome	  is	  what	  we	  find,	   it	  would	  suggest	  that	  1)	  Ingroup	  loyalty	  trumps	  fairness	  when	  resources	  are	   limited	  but	   2)	   when	   resources	   are	   not	   limited	   both	   principles	   apply	   equally;	   infants	   view	   both	  courses	  of	  action	  as	  acceptable	  and	  must	  learn	  from	  their	  culture	  how	  to	  prioritize	  in	  this	  context.	  	  	  
Method	  
Participants	  	   Participants	   were	   24	   healthy	   full-­‐term	   19-­‐month-­‐olds,	   14	   male	   and	   10	   female	  (range	  =	  18	  months	  26	  days	   to	  20	  months	  4	  days,	  M	   =	   19	  months	  18	  days).	   The	   infants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  each	  event	  (equal,	  favors-­‐ingroup,	  favors-­‐outgroup).	  Another	  5	  infants	  were	  excluded	  because	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  finish	  the	  experiment	  (3)	  or	  because	  they	  looked	  the	  maximum	  time	  allowed	  in	  the	  test	  trials	  (2).	  	  	  
Apparatus,	  stimuli	  and	  procedure	  The	  apparatus,	  stimuli	  and	  procedure	  were	  identical	  to	  that	  used	  in	  Experiment	  4,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  third	  identical	  toy	  or	  cookie.	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Results	  	  Infants’	   looking	   times	   during	   the	   final	   phases	   of	   both	   test	   trials	   (Fig.	   9)	   were	  averaged	   across	   trials	   and	   subjected	   to	   an	   ANOVA	  with	   event	   (equal,	   favors-­‐ingroup	   or	  favors-­‐outgroup)	   as	   a	   between	   subject	   factor.	   The	   analysis	   yielded	   only	   a	   marginally	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  event,	  F(2,	  21)	  =	  3.29,	  p	  =	  .057.	  A	  planned	  contrast	  revealed	  that	  infants	  who	   saw	   the	   favors-­‐outgroup	   event	   (M	   =	   34.7,	   SD	   =	   12.7)	   looked	   reliably	   longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event	  (M	  =	  24.8,	  SD	  =	  12.1)	  and	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  (M	  =	  20.7,	  SD	  =	  9.7),	  F(1,	  21)	  =	  24.03,	  p	  <.0001	  (the	  latter	  two	  groups	  did	  not	  differ	  F	  (1,	  21)	  =	  0.53,	  p	  =	  .475).	  	  	  
Discussion	  These	  data	  suggest	  that	  when	  there	  are	  sufficient	  resources	  for	  all	  three	  individuals	  involved	   in	   a	   distribution	   event	   (one	   distributor	   and	   two	   recipients),	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	   no	  longer	  view	  the	  equal	  event	  as	  unexpected.	  In	  other	  words,	  infants	  find	  it	  acceptable	  for	  a	  distributor	  to	  give	  an	  object	  to	  an	  outgroup	  individual	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  sufficient	  objects	  for	  all	  ingroup	  members.	  However,	  infants	  also	  view	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  as	  expected,	  which	  suggests	  that	  even	  when	  there	  are	  enough	  resources	  to	  go	  around,	  infants	  don’t	  view	  the	  distributor	  as	  obligated	  to	  give	  one	  to	  the	  outgroup	  individual.	  	  	  	  	  It	   seems	   likely	   then	   that	   infants	  must	   learn	   from	   their	   culture	   how	   to	   prioritize	  which	  principle	  to	  use	  in	  this	  type	  of	  situation;	  at	  19	  months	  they	  still	  rank	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	   fairness	   equally.	   However,	   research	   by	   Olson	   and	   Spelke	   (2008),	   discussed	   in	   the	  introduction,	  suggests	  that	  by	  3.5	  years	  of	  age,	  children	  prioritize	  fairness;	  as	  long	  as	  there	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were	   as	  many	   items	   as	   dolls,	   children	   helped	   a	   protagonist	   allocate	   items	   equally	   to	   all	  potential	   recipients	   regardless	   of	   how	   they	   were	   identified	   (i.e.,	   as	   the	   protagonist’s	  siblings	  and	  friends	  or	  as	  strangers).	  	  	  	  3.4	  EXPERIMENT	  6	  	   As	   adults,	   several	   factors	   affect	   whether	   we	   share	   resources	   with	   outgroup	  individuals.	  One	   such	   factor,	   as	  with	   children	   and	   infants,	   is	  whether	   there	   are	   sufficient	  resources	  for	  our	  ingroup;	  another	  factor	  is	  whether	  the	  resources	  are	  potentially	  valuable	  resources	  that	  might	  be	  needed	  at	  a	  future	  time.	  Do	  infants	  also	  take	  this	  latter	  factor	  into	  account	  when	   reasoning	   about	   resource	   allocations?	  Experiment	  6	  began	   to	   address	   this	  question:	  I	  asked	  whether	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  would	  view	  an	  equal	  distribution	  as	  unacceptable	  even	  when	   there	  were	   sufficient	   resources	   for	   all	   individuals	   present,	   if	   infants	   realized	  that	  these	  resources	  might	  be	  needed	  to	  complete	  a	  task?	  	  	   In	  addition,	  to	  extend	  the	  results	  of	  Experiments	  4	  and	  5	  to	  a	  new	  situation,	  I	  made	  two	   main	   changes.	   	   First,	   instead	   of	   watching	   interactions	   between	   different	   animal	  puppets,	   infants	   watched	   interactions	   between	   human	   assistants	   belonging	   to	   different	  minimal	   groups	  marked	   by	   distinctive	   outfits.	   The	   two	   individuals	   on	   either	   side	   of	   the	  apparatus	  were	  dressed	  in	  different	  outfits,	  and	  the	  experimenter	  at	  the	  back	  was	  dressed	  in	   one	   of	   these	   outfits	   (counterbalanced).	   Second,	   instead	   of	   distributing	   windfall	  resources,	   the	  experimenter	  provided	  instrumental	  help	  to	  one	  or	  both	  individuals.	   	  Each	  was	   doing	   a	   (different)	   task	   with	   a	   marker	   until	   it	   dried	   out.	   The	   experimenter	   then	  brought	  out	  a	   cupful	  of	  new	  markers,	   and	  she	  gave	  one	   to	  each	   individual	   (equal	  event),	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one	   only	   to	   her	   ingroup	   member	   (favors-­‐ingroup	   event),	   or	   one	   only	   to	   the	   outgroup	  individual	  (favors–outgroup	  event).	  	   At	   least	  two	  outcomes	  were	  possible.	  One	  possibility	  was	  that,	  as	   in	  Experiment	  5,	  infants	   would	   look	   reliably	   longer	   at	   the	   favors-­‐outgroup	   event	   than	   at	   the	   other	   two	  events,	   this	   would	   suggest	   that	   with	   ample	   resources	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	   see	   fairness	   as	  acceptable;	  infants	  would	  expect	  the	  experimenter	  to	  help	  both	  the	  ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  individuals,	   since	   she	   had	   ample	  markers.	   However,	   another	   possibility	  was	   that	   infants	  would	   look	   reliably	   longer	   at	   the	   favors-­‐outgroup	   and	   equal	   events	   than	   at	   the	   favors-­‐ingroup	   event	   (as	   in	   Experiment	   4);	   infants	   would	   expect	   the	   experimenter	   to	   give	   a	  marker	  only	  to	  the	  ingroup	  individual	  because	  although	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  markers,	  these	  are	  clearly	  needed	  to	  accomplish	  the	  task	  at	  hand.	   	  If	  this	  second	  possibility	  were	  correct,	  then	   it	   would	   suggest	   that	   at	   19	   months	   infants	   apply	   the	   ingroup	   loyalty	   principle	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	   fairness	   principle	   whenever	   resources	   are	   scarce	   or	   may	   be	   needed	   for	  completing	  a	  task.	  	  	  
Design	   	  In	  the	  experimental	  condition	  (Fig.	  10)	  of	  Experiment	  6,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  watched	  live	  events	   in	  which	   two	   individuals	  who	  belonged	  to	  different	  groups	  (marked	  by	  hippy	  and	  princess	  costumes),	  vainly	  attempted	  to	  color	  with	  dried-­‐out	  markers.	   In	  the	  equal	  event,	  an	  experimenter	  (who	  belonged	  one	  of	   the	   two	  groups),	  witnessed	  the	   individuals’	   failed	  efforts	   and	   offered	   a	   new	   marker	   to	   each	   individual.	   In	   the	   favors-­‐ingroup	   event,	   the	  experimenter	  gave	  a	  new	  marker	  only	  to	  the	  individual	  in	  her	  group.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  favors-­‐
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outgroup	  event,	   the	  experimenter	  gave	  a	  new	  marker	  only	   to	   the	   individual	  belonging	   to	  the	  other	  group.	  Each	   infant	  received	  two	  group-­‐familiarization	  trials,	  one	  orientation	  trial	  and	  one	  test	   trial	   (each	   infant	  saw	  only	  one	   test	  event).	  Each	  group-­‐familiarization	   trial	   served	   to	  introduce	  infants	  to	  the	  two	  groups,	  one	  at	  a	  time.	  During	  the	  initial	  (30-­‐s)	  phase	  of	  the	  first	  group-­‐familiarization	  trial,	  the	  experimenter	  and	  the	  individual	  who	  belonged	  to	  her	  same	  group	   (which	   costume	   and	   which	   individual	   were	   counterbalanced	   across	   infants)	   each	  read	   their	   own	   copy	   of	   the	   same	   book,	   and	   turned	   the	   pages	   in	   unison.	  During	   the	   final	  phase	  of	  the	  trial,	  the	  two	  group	  members	  continued	  to	  turn	  pages	  of	  their	  books	  until	  they	  reached	   the	   end	   (at	   which	   point	   they	   each	   closed	   their	   book	   and	   paused)	   or	   until	   the	  infants	   looked	   away,	   thus	   ending	   the	   trial.	   During	   the	   initial	   (30-­‐s)	   phase	   of	   the	   second	  group-­‐familiarization	   trial,	   only	   the	   individual	   who	   belonged	   to	   the	   other	   group	   was	  present	  in	  the	  apparatus.	  She	  worked	  to	  put	  a	  puzzle	  together;	  she	  picked	  up	  one	  piece	  at	  a	  time	  and	  placed	  it	  in	  the	  correct	  location.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  trial,	  she	  continued	  to	  put	   the	   remaining	  pieces	   together	  until	   she	   completed	   the	  puzzle	   (at	  which	  point	   she	  looked	  down	  and	  paused)	  or	  until	  the	  infants	  looked	  away	  and	  the	  trial	  ended.	  	  In	   the	  orientation	   trial,	   infants	   saw	   the	   two	  groups	   together	   for	   the	   first	   time;	   the	  member(s)	  of	  one	  group	  colored	  pictures,	  whereas	  the	  member(s)	  of	  the	  other	  group	  drew	  letters	   on	   a	   lined	   piece	   of	   paper.	   The	   purpose	   of	   the	   orientation	   trial	   was	   to	   further	  establish	  each	  group	  as	  well	  as	  to	  introduce	  infants	  to	  the	  activities	  that	  would	  take	  place	  during	   the	   test	   trial.	   At	   the	   start	   of	   the	   initial	   (35-­‐s)	   phase,	   the	   experimenter	   and	   her	  ingroup	  member	  each	  colored	  a	  line	  drawing	  of	  a	  cupcake	  on	  a	  green	  piece	  of	  paper,	  with	  red	  Crayola	  markers.	  The	  other	  (outgroup)	  individual	  entered	  the	  stage	  with	  her	  own	  red	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marker	   and	   a	   piece	   of	   white	   lined	   paper,	   and	   she	   began	   to	   write	   the	   ABC’s	   while	   the	  members	  of	  the	  other	  group	  continued	  to	  color.	  Next,	  a	  bell	  rang,	  and	  the	  experimenter	  at	  the	  back	  window,	  said,	  “Oh!	  I	  have	  to	  go!”,	  put	  her	  cap	  on	  her	  marker,	  and	  left	  the	  stage.	  The	  two	  individuals	  continued	  to	  color	  or	  write	  letters	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  There	  was	  no	  final	  phase	  because	  the	  trial	  automatically	  ended	  after	  35	  seconds	  regardless	  of	  infants’	  looking	  behavior.	  Our	  reasoning	  here	  was	  that	  we	  wanted	  to	  limit	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  infants	  saw	  the	   ingroup	  and	  outgroup	  members	  using	   their	  markers	   together	   to	  avoid	   the	  possibility	  that	   infants	   might	   view	   this	   behavior	   as	   coordinated	   and	   thus	   as	   a	   stronger	   marker	   of	  group	  membership	  than	  the	  costumes.	  	  	   The	  initial	  (44-­‐s)	  phase	  of	  the	  test	  trial	  began	  in	  the	  same	  way	  the	  orientation	  trial	  ended;	   the	   two	   individuals	   (one	   belonging	   to	   each	   group)	   attempted	   to	   color	   or	   write	  letters	   on	   their	   respective	   papers,	   however	   both	   individuals	   were	   unsuccessful	   because	  their	   markers	   had	   run	   out	   of	   ink.	   After	   each	   individual	   tried	   to	   mark	   on	   her	   page,	   she	  looked	   at	   her	   marker	   with	   mild	   frustration	   and	   then	   attempted	   to	   color	   again.	   The	  experimenter	  at	  the	  back	  then	  entered	  with	  her	  own	  marker	  and	  picture	  to	  color,	  and	  she	  began	  to	  color	  while	  both	  individuals	  attempted	  to	  use	  their	  dried-­‐out	  markers	  one	  more	  time.	  Each	  individual	  then	  exclaimed	  in	  turn,	  “My	  marker	  is	  broken!”,	  “My	  marker	  is	  broken	  too!”	  (which	  individual	  spoke	  first	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  infants).	  The	  experimenter	  responded,	  “I	  have	  some	  more	  markers!”.	  She	  then	  bent	  down,	  retrieved	  a	  cup	  filled	  with	  7	  identical	  red	  markers,	  and	  set	  it	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  stage	  in	  front	  of	  her.	  In	  the	  equal	  event,	  the	  experimenter	  picked	  up	  two	  markers	  (one	  in	  each	  hand),	  said,	  “Here!	  You	  can	  have	  one	  of	   my	   new	   markers”,	   and	   handed	   a	   marker	   to	   both	   individuals	   at	   the	   same	   time.	   The	  experimenter	  then	  placed	  the	  cup	  of	  markers	  back	  onto	  the	  room	  floor	  and	  everyone	  went	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back	  to	  drawing	  with	  their	  markers.	  Next	  a	  bell	  rang	  and	  both	  individuals	  said,	  “Oh,	  I	  have	  to	  go”	  and	  left	  the	  stage,	  leaving	  their	  markers	  and	  papers	  behind.	  During	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  test	  trial,	  the	  experimenter	  continued	  to	  color	  until	  the	  trial	  ended.	  	  	   In	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event,	  the	  actions	  were	  identical,	  except	  that	  the	  experimenter	  gave	  a	  marker	  only	  to	  the	  individual	  who	  belonged	  to	  her	  same	  group	  and	  therefore	  only	  the	  experimenter	  and	  her	  ingroup	  member	  continued	  to	  color;	  the	  individual	  who	  belonged	  to	  the	  other	  group	  simply	  looked	  down	  at	  her	  paper	  and	  paused	  until	  the	  bell	  rang	  to	  call	  her	   away.	   In	   the	   favors-­‐outgroup	   event,	   the	   actions	   were	   again	   identical	   to	   the	   favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  except	  that	  the	  experimenter	  gave	  a	  marker	  only	  to	  the	  individual	  who	  did	  not	  belong	  to	  her	  group.	  	  	  	  
Method	  
Participants	  	   Participants	  were	  24	  healthy	  full-­‐term	  19-­‐month-­‐old	  infants,	  12	  male	  and	  12	  female	  (range	  =	  18	  months	  20	  days	  to	  20	  months	  7	  days,	  M	  =19	  months	  16	  days)	  from	  English	  speaking	  families;	  8	  infants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  each	  event	  (equal,	  favors-­‐ingroup	  or	  favors-­‐outgroup).	  Another	  13	  infants	  were	  excluded	  for	  looking	  the	  maximum	  time	  allowed	  (9),	  for	  not	  being	  able	  to	  complete	  the	  experiment	  or	  for	  looking	  more	  than	  2	  times	  shorter	  than	  the	  condition	  mean	  (1).	  	  	  
Apparatus	  and	  stimuli	  The	   apparatus	   was	   identical	   to	   that	   used	   in	   previous	   experiments.	   The	   two	  individuals	  knelt	  at	  windows	  (51	  cm	  x	  38	  cm)	  in	  the	  right	  and	  left	  walls	  of	  the	  apparatus;	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the	  experimenter	  knelt	  at	  a	  window	  (71.5	  cm	  x	  56	  cm)	  in	  the	  back	  wall	  of	  the	  apparatus.	  The	   individuals	   entered	  and	  exited	   the	  apparatus	  by	  opening	  and	   closing	  a	   sliding	  white	  curtain;	  the	  experimenter	  entered	  and	  exited	  using	  two	  attached	  doors.	  	  	  The	  hippy	  costume	  consisted	  of	  a	  dark	  green	  turtleneck,	  purple	  patterned	  headband	  (106	  cm	  x	  9.5	  cm),	  and	  pink	   foam	  eyeglasses	   (13.5	  cm	  x	  12.5	  cm	  x	  6.5	  cm);	   the	  princess	  costume	  consisted	  of	  a	  pink	  patterned	  turtleneck,	  a	  yellow	  foam	  crown	  (22	  cm	  x	  10	  cm	  x	  15.3	  cm),	  and	  a	  felt	  pink	  flower	  necklace	  (30.5	  cm	  x	  1.5	  cm	  x	  23.5	  cm).	  	  Across	  trials,	  the	  individuals	  and	  experimenter	  played	  with	  several	  items,	  including	  a	  peter	  rabbit	  board	  book	  (10	  cm	  x	  10	  cm	  x	  1.2	  cm),	  a	  Disney	  princess	  puzzle	  (20.2	  cm	  x	  14.3	   cm	   x	   0.5	   cm),	   a	   green	   sheet	   of	   paper	   (21.5	   cm	   x	   14.2	   cm)	  with	   a	   printed	   cupcake	  drawing,	  a	  white	  sheet	  of	  paper	  (21.5	  cm	  x	  14.2	  cm)	  with	  black	  ruled	  lines,	  and	  red	  Crayola	  markers	  (13.8	  cm	  x	  1.4	  cm	  x	  1	  cm).	  A	  plastic	  cup	  (8	  cm	  x	  8	  cm	  x	  8.5	  cm)	  was	  also	  used	  as	  a	  container	  for	  the	  markers.	  	  Each	   test	   session	  was	   recorded,	  monitored	   and	   checked	  off-­‐line	   as	   in	   all	   previous	  experiments.	  	  	  
Procedure	  The	  procedure	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  used	  in	  previous	  experiments.	  The	  final	  phase	  of	  each	   trial	   ended	  when	   the	   infant	   (a)	   looked	  away	   for	  2	   consecutive	   seconds	  after	  having	  looked	   for	   at	   least	   5	   cumulative	   seconds	   or	   (b)	   looked	   for	   a	  maximum	  of	   70	   cumulative	  seconds.	  Interobserver	  agreement	  averaged	  96%	  per	  trial	  per	  infant.	  Preliminary	  analyses	  revealed	  no	  significant	  interaction	  of	  event	  with	  infant’s	  sex,	  costume	  of	  ingroup	  (hippy	  or	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princess)	  or	  who	  spoke	  first	   in	  the	  test	  trial	  (experimenter	  on	  right	  or	  left);	  therefore	  the	  data	  were	  collapsed	  across	  these	  three	  latter	  three	  factors.	  	  
	  
Results	  Infants’	  looking	  times	  during	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  the	  test	  trial	  (Fig.	  11)	  were	  subjected	  to	  an	  ANOVA	  with	  event	  (equal,	  favors-­‐ingroup	  or	  favors-­‐outgroup)	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  factor.	  The	  analysis	  yielded	  only	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  event,	  F(2,	  21)	  =	  7.63,	  p	  =	  .003.	  A	  planned	  contrast	  revealed	  that	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐outgroup	  event	  (M=	  41.1,	  SD	  =	  11.1)	  and	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event	  (M	  =	  39.8,	  SD	  =	  16.2)	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  (M	  =	  20.4,	  SD	  =	  6.1),	  F(1,21)	  =	  15.29,	  p	  <.001	  (the	  former	  two	  groups	  did	  not	  differ,	  F(1,	  21)	  =	  0.04,	  p	  =	  .843).	  	  	  
Discussion	  and	  Future	  Directions	  
	   These	  results	  replicate	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  4	  in	  a	  task	  that	  uses:	  instrumental	  helping	  instead	  of	  windfall	  resource	  distribution,	  human	  experimenters	  and	  groups	  based	  on	   costumes	   instead	   of	   puppets	   of	   different	   animal	   kinds,	   and	   abundant	   but	   potentially	  needed	   resources	   instead	   of	   scarce	   resources.	   This	   suggests	   that	   by	   19	   months,	   infants	  have	   a	   sensitivity	   to	   both	   fairness	   and	   ingroup	   loyalty	   that	   they	   can	   apply	   flexibly	   in	  different	  situations.	  	  	   However,	   there	   are	   at	   least	   two	   alternative	   interpretations.	   	   One	   possible	  interpretation	  is	  that	  with	  many	  markers	  in	  the	  cup,	  infants	  are	  not	  able	  to	  determine	  the	  exact	   number	   of	   markers	   and	   therefore	   use	   a	   strategy	   of	   keeping	   all	   resources	   for	   the	  ingroup.	   To	   address	   this	   concern,	   I	   am	   currently	   testing	   infants	   in	   a	  3-­‐marker	   condition,	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which	   is	   identical	   to	   the	  experimental	   condition	  except	   that	   the	  experimenter	  only	  has	  3	  markers	   in	  her	  cup	   (instead	  of	  7).	  With	  only	  3	  markers,	   infants	   should	  have	  no	  difficulty	  determining	  how	  many	  makers	  are	  in	  the	  cup.	  Therefore,	  if	  infants	  who	  see	  the	  equal	  and	  favors-­‐outgroup	  events	  look	  reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  see	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event	  (as	   in	   Experiment	   6),	   it	   provides	   more	   evidence	   that	   when	   resources	   are	   needed	   to	  complete	  a	  task,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  kept	  for	  the	  ingroup.	  	  	   Another	  alternative	   interpretation	   is	   that	   infants	   think	  when	  humans	  are	   involved	  resources	   should	   always	   be	   kept	   for	   the	   ingroup	   regardless	   of	   how	  many	   there	   are.	   To	  address	   this	   idea,	   I	  will	  use	   the	  same	  method	  as	   in	  Experiment	  5	  but	  with	   three	  humans	  and	  three	  markers;	  there	  will	  again	  be	  two	  individuals	  who	  belong	  to	  different	  groups	  and	  one	   experimenter	   who	   belongs	   to	   the	   same	   group	   as	   one	   of	   the	   individuals	   and	   the	  experimenter	  will	  divide	  the	  markers	  between	  the	  two	  individuals.	  If	  infants	  find	  the	  equal	  and	  favors-­‐ingroup	  distributions	  acceptable,	  as	  they	  did	  in	  Experiment	  5,	  then	  it	  suggests	  that	   the	   findings	   in	  Experiment	  6	   are	   really	   about	  whether	   resources	   are	  needed	   for	   the	  task	  at	  hand.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	   results	   from	  Experiments	  3-­‐6	  are	   important	   for	   two	  main	   reasons.	  First,	   they	  contribute	  to	  the	  methodological	  assessment	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  ingroup	  loyalty	  in	  the	  second	  year	   of	   life.	   Specifically,	   our	   results	   indicate	   that	  when	   tested	  with	   a	   third-­‐party	   task	   as	  opposed	   to	   a	   first-­‐party	   task	   (e.g.,	   Olson	   &	   Spelke,	   2008;	  Moore,	   2009;	  Warneken	   et	   al.,	  2010)	  infants	  display	  expectations	  about	  ingroup	  loyalty	  as	  early	  as	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  in	  a	  third-­‐party	  task,	  infants’	  tendencies	  to	  act	  selfishly	  do	  not	  interfere	  with	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their	   expectations	   about	   ingroup	   loyalty	   and	   thus	   the	   results	   from	   third-­‐party	   tasks	  provide	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  younger	  infants’	  expectations	  about	  how	  others	  should	  act	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  	  	   Second,	   the	   present	   results	   bear	   on	   theoretical	   accounts	   of	   the	   mechanism	   of	  ingroup	  biased	  behavior.	   	  Researchers	  have	   speculated	   that	   ingroup	  biased	  behavior	   is	   a	  moral	   principle	   that	   has	   evolved	   as	   a	   biological	   adaptation	   (Brewer,	   1999;	   Haidt,	   2007;	  Tajfel,	  1982),	  and	  the	  evidence	  reported	  here	  that	  infants	  in	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life	  already	  display	   very	   flexible	   notions	   of	   ingroup	   loyalty	   (and	   fairness)	   that	   they	   can	   apply	  appropriately	  in	  very	  different	  contexts,	  supports	  this	  view.	  	  	  In	  combination,	  consistent	  results	  in	  Experiment	  4	  and	  Experiment	  6	  suggests	  that	  by	  the	  second	  year	  of	  life,	  infants	  are	  able	  to	  apply	  notions	  of	  ingroup	  loyalty	  and	  fairness	  in	   very	   different	   contexts	   and	   that	   by	   19	  months	   infants	   seem	   to	   privilege	   favoring	   the	  ingroup	  over	  fairness	  (at	  least	  when	  resources	  are	  scarce	  or	  needed	  by	  the	  ingroup).	  These	  results	   are	   again	   consistent	   with	   a	   principle-­‐based	   approach	   and	   provide	   converging	  evidence	   that	   we	   come	   to	   the	   world	   equipped	   with	   the	   complex	   and	   flexible	   cognitive	  architecture	  we	  need	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  social	  world	  around	  us.	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CHAPTER	  4	  
CONCLUSION	  	   	  	   In	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   have	   addressed	   two	   major	   questions	   related	   to	   the	  development	  of	  infants’	  concern	  for	  fairness:	  1)	  at	  what	  age	  do	  infants	  first	  show	  a	  concern	  for	   fairness	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   resources	   should	   be	   distributed?	   And	   2)	   how	   does	   group	  membership	  affect	  these	  expectations?	  	  	   Recent	  research	  looking	  at	  infants’	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  (e.g.,	  Geraci	  &	  Surian,	  2011;	  Meristo	  &	  Surian,	  2013;	  Sommerville	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  has	  yielded	  results	  compatible	  with	  two	  diverging	  hypotheses	  regarding	  early	  responses	  to	  fairness:	  the	  late-­‐emergence	   hypothesis	   and	   the	   early-­‐emergence	   hypothesis.	   	   In	   Experiments	   1	   and	   2,	   I	  attempted	  to	  figure	  out	  which	  hypothesis	  was	  correct	  by	  testing	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  with	   a	   simple	   two-­‐item	  one-­‐distributor	   task:	   an	   experimenter	   divided	   cookies	   either	  equally	  or	  unequally	  between	  two	  animated	  puppets	  (penguins	  in	  Experiment	  1	  and	  Elmos	  in	  Experiment	  2).	  The	  results	  of	  both	  experiments	  were	  positive:	  both	  9-­‐	  and	  4-­‐month-­‐old	  infants	   expected	   the	   experimenter	   to	   divide	   the	   cookies	   equally,	   which	   suggests	   that	  infants	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  do	  show	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness.	  	  These	   positive	   results	   are	   important	   for	   several	   reasons.	   First,	   they	   provide	  evidence	   in	   support	   of	   the	   early-­‐emergence	   hypothesis.	   Second,	   they	   provide	   the	   first	  demonstration	   that	   infants	   in	   the	   first	   year	   of	   life	   already	   expect	   a	   distributor	   to	   divide	  objects	   fairly.	   Third,	   they	   constrain	   theoretical	   accounts	   of	   the	   developmental	   origins	   of	  fairness.	  The	  finding	  that	  infants	  as	  young	  as	  4	  months	  already	  expect	  a	  distributor	  to	  act	  fairly	  is	  consistent	  with	  speculations	  that	  a	  concern	  for	  fairness	  is	  part	  of	  humans’	  evolved	  
57	  	  
adaptation	   for	   intuitive	   moral	   reasoning	   (e.g.,	   Haidt	   &	   Joseph,	   2007;	   Jackendoff,	   2007;	  Premack,	   2007;	   Sigmund	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   This	   evidence	   also	   supports	   the	   possibility	   that	  young	   infants’	   responses	   to	   fair	   and	   unfair	   distributors	   stem	   from	  moral,	   as	   opposed	   to	  affiliative,	   evaluations	   (Geraci	   &	   Surian,	   2011;	  Meristo	   &	   Surian,	   2013).	   If	   young	   infants	  possess	   a	   sense	   of	   fairness,	   then	   they	   may	   see	   an	   unfair	   distributor	   not	   only	   as	   a	   less	  desirable	   affiliate	   but	   also	   as	   a	  moral	   violator	  who	  deserves	   to	   be	   punished.	   Finally,	   our	  positive	  results	  inform	  the	  methodological	  assessment	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  fairness	  in	  the	  first	  year	   of	   life.	   Specifically,	   they	   suggest	   that	   young	   infants	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   display	   a	  sensitivity	   to	   fairness	  when	   tested	  with	   one-­‐distributor	   tasks	   and	   two-­‐item	  distributions	  (as	   opposed	   to	   two-­‐distributor	   tasks	   or	   four-­‐item	   distributions;	   Geraci	   &	   Surian,	   2011;	  Sommerville	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  one-­‐distributor	  task	  is	  less	  challenging	  because	  infants	  see	  the	  same	  individual	  performing	  the	  fair	  and	  unfair	  action.	  It	  is	  also	  likely	  that	  a	  two-­‐item	  distribution	  is	  less	  challenging	  because	  it	  requires	  infants	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  fewer	  items	  or	  because	  it	  allows	  a	  some-­‐versus-­‐none	  distinction.	  	  	   In	   combination,	   these	   results	   indicate	   that	   infants	   as	   young	   as	   4	   months	   of	   age	  already	   expect	   fair	   allocations,	   providing	   new	   evidence	   that	   expectations	   about	   how	  individuals	  should	  act	  toward	  others	  emerge	  early	  in	  human	  life	  (Baillargeon	  et	  al.,	  2015).	  	  	   In	   Experiments	   3-­‐6,	   I	   focused	   on	   infants	   in	   the	   second	   year	   of	   life	   and	   examined	  whether	  and	  how	  their	  expectations	  about	  fairness	  are	  modified	  by	  considerations	  of	  group	  membership.	  The	  most	  consistent	  finding	  from	  past	  studies	  is	  that	  children	  from	  ages	  3	  to	  10	  favor	  ingroup	  members	  when	  distributing	  resources	  or	  choosing	  allocations	  (Gerson	  &	  Damon,	  1978;	  Moore,	  2009;	  Olson	  &	  Spelke,	  2008;	  Warneken	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  However,	  with	  the	   exception	   of	   Olson	   and	   Spelke	   (2008),	   the	   children	   in	   these	   studies	   were	   directly	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involved	  in	  the	  distribution	  as	  potential	  recipients	  making	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  self	   interest	  was	   a	   driving	   force	   in	   their	   distributive	   behavior.	   Using	   third-­‐party	   situations,	   where	  infants	  are	  simply	  outside	  observers,	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  what	  infants	  think	  should	  happen	  versus	  what	  they	  themselves	  would	  do.	  	  In	   Experiment	   3,	   I	   asked	   whether	   19-­‐month-­‐olds	   would	   expect	   fairness	   in	   a	  distribution	  event	   in	  which	  an	   individual	   from	  one	  group	  divided	  resources	  between	  two	  potential	  recipients	  from	  a	  different	  group.	  I	  used	  different	  animal	  puppets	  to	  represent	  the	  ingroup	   and	   outgroup	   individuals:	   a	   monkey	   (or	   giraffe)	   puppet	   divided	   two	   cookies	  equally	   or	   unequally	   between	   two	   giraffe	   or	   (monkey)	   puppets.	   Infants	   who	   saw	   the	  unequal	  event	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event,	  suggesting	  that	  by	   19	   months	   infants	   possess	   an	   abstract	   expectation	   of	   fairness	   that	   applies	   broadly	  across	  groups:	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  if	  A1	  divides	  resources	  between	  B1	  and	  B2,	  then	  A1	  should	  do	  so	  fairly.	  In	   Experiment	   4,	   I	   asked	   if	   infants	   would	   still	   display	   an	   expectation	   of	   fairness	  when	  one	  of	  the	  potential	  recipients	  belonged	  to	  the	  same	  group	  as	  the	  distributor	  and	  the	  other	  potential	  recipient	  belonged	  to	  a	  different	  group.	  Here	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  saw	  a	  monkey	  (or	  giraffe)	  puppet	  divide	  two	  cookies	  between	  another	  monkey	  and	  giraffe:	  the	  distributor	  puppet	  divided	  the	  cookies	  equally	  (equal	  event),	  gave	  both	  cookies	  to	  his	  ingroup	  member	  (favors-­‐ingroup	  event)	   or	   gave	  both	   cookies	   to	   the	  outgroup	   individual	   (favors-­‐outgroup	  event).	   Infants	  who	   saw	   the	   favors-­‐outgroup	   event	   and	   infants	  who	   saw	   the	   equal	   event	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  during	  the	  test	  trials	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  infants	  expected	  the	  distributor	  to	  favor	  his	  ingroup	  member,	  thus	   showing	   some	   sensitivity	   to	   the	   ingroup	   loyalty	   principle	   and	   ranking	   it	   above	   the	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fairness	   principle	   in	   this	   situation.	   One	   possible	   explanation	   is	   that	   when	   resources	   are	  limited,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  saved	  for	  the	  ingroup.	  	  To	  explore	   this	   idea,	   in	  Experiment	  5,	   infants	   saw	   identical	   events	  except	   that	   the	  distributor	   puppet	   had	   three	   objects	   to	   give	   instead	  of	   only	   two.	  Here,	  when	   there	  were	  adequate	   resources	   (one	   for	   each	   individual)	   infants	   now	   expected	   either	   an	   equal	  distribution	  or	  a	  distribution	  that	  favored	  the	  ingroup.	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  when	  there	  are	  sufficient	  resources,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  find	  it	  acceptable	  for	  a	  distributor	  to	  give	  an	  object	  to	  an	  outgroup	   individual,	  but	   they	  don’t	  view	   the	  distributor	   as	  obligated	   to	  do	   so,	   thus	  showing	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  both	  the	  ingroup	  loyalty	  principle	  and	  the	  fairness	  principle.	  	   Finally,	  in	  Experiment	  6	  I	  asked	  whether	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  would	  always	  find	  an	  equal	  distribution	  acceptable	  as	   long	  as	   there	  were	  sufficient	  resources,	  or	  whether	   there	  were	  conditions	  where	   infants	  would	   find	   an	   equal	  distribution	  unexpected,	   such	   as	  when	   the	  resources	  might	  be	  needed	  by	  the	  group	  to	  complete	  a	  task.	  In	  this	  experiment,	  infants	  saw	  human	  individuals	  who	  belonged	  to	  different	  minimal	  groups	  marked	  by	  distinctive	  outfits	  instead	   of	   puppets	   and	   instead	   of	   distributing	   windfall	   resources,	   the	   experimenter	  provided	  instrumental	  help	  to	  one	  or	  both	  individuals	  by	  replacing	  a	  marker	  that	  had	  run	  out	  of	  ink	  with	  a	  new	  marker.	  Just	  as	  in	  Experiment	  4,	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  equal	  event	  and	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐outgroup	  event	  looked	  reliably	  longer	  than	  infants	  who	  saw	  the	  favors-­‐ingroup	  event,	  suggesting	  that	  when	  resources	  are	  needed	  for	  a	  task,	  19-­‐month-­‐olds	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  kept	  for	  the	  group.	  	  	   In	  combination,	  the	  results	  from	  Experiments	  3-­‐6	  add	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  infants	   in	   the	   second	  year	  of	   life	   expect	   others	   to	   act	   in	   a	   given	   situation.	  At	  19	  months,	  infants	   find	   it	   acceptable	   to	   share	   resources	  with	   an	   outgroup	   individual	   only	  when	   the	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resources	   are	   not	   scarce	   or	   are	   not	   needed	   by	   the	   ingroup	   to	   complete	   a	   task;	   when	  resources	  are	  scarce	  or	  needed,	  the	  only	  acceptable	  action	  is	  to	  keep	  the	  resources	  for	  the	  group.	  This	  ability	  of	   infants	   in	  the	  second	  year	  of	   life	  to	  apply	  notions	  of	   ingroup	  loyalty	  and	   fairness	   in	   such	   different	   contexts	   also	   supports	   the	   view	   that	   ingroup	   loyalty	   is	   a	  moral	  principle	  that	  has	  evolved	  as	  a	  biological	  adaptation	  (e.g.,	  Brewer,	  1999;	  Haidt,	  2007;	  Tajfel,	  1982).	  In	  fact,	  the	  results	  of	  all	  six	  experiments	  are	  consistent	  with	  a	  principle-­‐based	  approach	   and	   suggest	   that	   as	   humans	  we	   come	   to	   the	  world	   already	   equipped	  with	   the	  flexible	  cognitive	  architecture	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  world	  around	  us.	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Fig. 1. Events shown in the experimental condition. In the familiarization trial, two animated puppet 
penguins (placed on the hands of a hidden assistant) danced from side to side and then paused until the 
trial ended. In the two test trials, an experimenter brought in two cookies, gave one to one penguin (side 
was counterbalanced across infants), and then gave the other cookie to either the same penguin (unequal 
event) or the other penguin (equal event) (order was counterbalanced). As the events unfolded, the 
experimenter looked naturally at the penguins and at the objects she acted on, but she never made eye 
contact with the infants. In each test trial, after the experimenter left with her empty plate, the penguins 
looked down and paused until the trial ended. To help the assistant and experimenter adhere to the events’ 
scripts, a metronome beat softly once per second. During each testing session, one camera captured an 
image of the events, and another camera captured an image of the infant. The two images were combined, 
projected onto a computer monitor located behind the apparatus, and monitored by the supervisor to 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fig. 2. Events shown in the inanimate-control condition. The familiarization and test events shown in this 
condition were identical to those in the experimental condition except that the penguins were inanimate: 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fig. 3. Events shown in the cover-control condition. Infants first saw the same familiarization trial as in the 
experimental condition, with the animated penguins. In the test trials, covers stood over the penguins’ 
placemats, and the experimenter removed these covers one at a time (order was counterbalanced across 
infants) to reveal the two cookies. In the equal event, one cookie was in front of each penguin; in the unequal 
event, both cookies were in front of the same penguin (side was counterbalanced). After the experimenter 
withdrew, the penguins looked down and paused until the trial ended, as in the experimental condition.  	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Fig. 4. Mean looking times at the unequal and equal events in the experimental, inanimate-control, and cover-
control conditions. The errors bars represent standard errors, and the asterisk denotes a significant difference (p 
< .0005). 	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Fig. 5.  Elmo puppets used in the experimental condition.  	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Fig. 6.  Mean looking times at the unequal and equal events in the experimental, inanimate-control and cover-
control conditions. The asterisk denotes a significant difference.   	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Fig. 7. Distributive events shown in experiment 3. In two identical test trials infants saw a monkey (or giraffe) 
puppet distribute toys or cookies to two puppets belonging to a different group (type of puppet distributor and 
recipients were counterbalanced across infants).  In each test trial the distributor puppet brought in two 
objects, and gave both to one recipient (unequal event) or one to each (equal event).  	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Fig. 8. Distributive events shown in experiment 4. In two identical test trials infants saw a monkey (or giraffe) 
puppet distribute toys or cookies to another monkey and giraffe (type of puppet distributor was 
counterbalanced across infants). The distributor puppet either gave both objects to it’s ingroup member 
(favors-ingroup event), one object to each recipient (equal event) or both to the outgroup member (favors-




	  	  	  	  	  
Fig. 9. Mean looking times at the unequal and equal events in experiment 3; favors-ingroup, equal and favors-
outgroup events in experiment 4 and experiment 5. The asterisks denote a significant difference.  	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Familiarization Trial 1 Familiarization Trial 2
Habituation Orientation  Trial 
Fig. 10. Events shown in the experimental condition. In the familiarization trials infants saw members of each 
group either read a book or put a puzzle together (which individuals belonged to which group was 
counterbalanced across infants). In the orientation trial infants saw members of each group color group-
specific pictures. The test trial began with the two individuals at each side attempting to color with broken 
markers. When the experimenter at the back returned, each individual informed her of her broken marker 
(which individual spoke first was counterbalanced across infants) and the experimenter either offered a new 
marker to both individuals (equal event), only to her ingroup member (favors-ingroup event), or only to the 
outgroup member (favors-outgroup event).  	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Fig. 11. Mean looking times at the favors-ingroup, equal and favors-outgroup events in experiment 6. The 
asterisk denotes a significant difference.  	  
